THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Soviet and Russian Orthodoxy.

The persecution of religion in Soviet Russia, although some ave doubted and others denied it, is an unquestionable fact. he evidence for this is many-sided and overwhelming. In the es of the Bolsheviks the religious man must be a bad citizen, en as was the Christian of the first three centuries in the eyes patriotic Roman governors. The attempt to prove, after the anner of Lactantius and other Christian apologists, that it was ly the worst emperors who persecuted the Christians, has oken down. Trajan, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, Septimius everus were among the persecutors. The Roman patriot was nvinced that the Christian could not give a whole-hearted yalty to the Roman State, and that, were Christian ideals to evail throughout the empire, the State must collapse. The oman patriot was right. The Russian patriot of the Bolshevik pe feels exactly the same with regard to the religious man in ussia to-day. The Roman State in its later period was based on the worship of the emperor ('the Beast' as the author of e *Revelation* calls it): the Soviet State is based upon atheism.

Where there is a fundamental conflict of principles on an sue of prime importance, what is a government to do? It can tempt to meet the situation by counter-education and propaanda. This is the modern civilized way. Or it can adopt the ethod of persecution—fines, imprisonment, torture, exile, xecution. That is the ancient and barbarous way. The Bolhevik authorities are making the fullest use of both ways, and

are plainly achieving no little success in what they correctl
regard as their fight for existence against internal disruptiv
forces.

Of course, their policy appears abominable not simply to th
religious world, be it that of Christendom, Jewry, or Islam, b
to all civilized people. That sacred buildings should be des
crated and destroyed, sacred rites prohibited and parodie
parents prevented from teaching their children their own rel
gion, seems to us all detestable. And that people should b
deprived of freedom, and even of life itself, because of the
loyalty to what they believe to be their duty to God, seems to u
to be even more atrocious.

But what is to be done? Will protests by bodies of religiou
people in non-Russian countries check Bolshevik persecution
It is more likely to stimulate it. The condemnations by Pope
and Archbishops, because they are naturally to be expected, ar
ineffective. Masses of Reparation in St. Peter's at Rome ma
impress the Roman Catholic world, but to the Soviet world the
must seem fatuous and provocative.

In England the situation is further complicated by the fac
that a successful anti-Bolshevik agitation is a political asse
which may be used to discredit or even unseat a minorit
Government which has made more cordial relations with Russi
an important feature of its policy

The situation is intolerable, but what is to be done? Will th
breaking off of diplomatic contact or trade relations lead th
Bolsheviks to change their attitude towards religion? That i
most improbable. The threat judiciously used through our diplo
matic machinery may do something to ameliorate the situation
but to break the relations would be to court failure. Olive
Cromwell sent an English squadron to the Mediterranean t
check the persecution of the Waldenses by the House of Savoy
and no doubt European and American fleets sent to blockad
the Russian ports might impress the Bolsheviks with the neces
sity of abandoning open persecution of religion. But there i
little likelihood of such drastic action being taken. Moreover
quite apart from home-Communist opposition to such a policy
there would also be a very powerful pacifist opposition whic
few of the Greater Powers would care to face. As the policy o

threats, unless there be the determination and power to carry them out, is a despicable policy, the blasphemous and blood-stained Bolshevik is better left alone. We should like to feel that cruel intolerance will secure an inevitable reaction in favour of religion in Russia; that the Christian Church in those regions will arise much the stronger, purer, wiser—better in every way for its Baptism of Blood. Tertullian invented the impressive axiom, *Semen est sanguis Christianorum* ('The blood of martyrs is the seed of Christians'), but history demonstrates that persecution can effectively destroy religious movements. The Japanese stamped out the Christian Church in Japan in the seventeenth century, and the cruelties of the Inquisition extirpated Protestant reforming movements in Spain in the sixteenth century.

There is unfortunately another side to this depressing picture. The Russian Church has herself for many years supported, if not actively, at least passively, the persecution of Jews and Stundists, and though we are far from regarding the present situation as entirely deserved, it is impossible not to realise that had the Russian Church been, not more orthodox, but more truly Christian in her life and policy, the present appalling situation in Russia might have been prevented. The Methodist movement did more to sap French atheistic revolutionary principles in England in the eighteenth century than did the repressive measures of the British Government.

Modern Russian Orthodoxy depicted by those who are by no means hostile either to the Christian religion or to the Tzarist régime, as for instance we have it presented in Gleb Botkin's *The God who didn't laugh*,* produces an unforgettable impression that Russian Orthodoxy did little more than develop a simple and superstitious piety in the Russian peasant and a mystical ecstasy in its nobler ascetics. It enshrined the Church's sacred rites in an aesthetic setting which blended the splendour and sensuousness of the Orient with religious devotion. Yet it lacked what we modern Christians cannot but regard as the real Christian thing which endeavours, as intelligently and as unselfishly as it can, to serve in manifold ways the welfare of the community in the spirit of Christ.

* Published by Victor Gollancz, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden; price 7/6 (1929).

Russian Orthodoxy has largely succumbed for the sam reason that the English monastic system succumbed in Tud times. Though possessed of vast resources and enormous oppo tunities, Russian Orthodoxy lacked the enterprise and the energ necessary to put them to the best use. Static in its though superstitious in its piety, somnolent in its policy, asceti mystical, ecclesiastical in its spirit, not dominantly ethical n characterized by a whole-hearted devotion to truth, freedom, an humanity, it has fallen — a warning to other Christian churche whose fate, it may be, is to dissolve quietly rather than to co lapse amid blood and terror.

What we have written may seem harsh, but it is not unjus The superstitious and largely non-moral character of Russia religion is notorious. Voltaire wrote: 'This is a people whic regards it as a mortal sin to eat an egg on a fast day, yet drink itself drunk every feast day.' The Russian novelist who relate that a Russian peasant going out with an axe to murder hi neighbour, and suddenly remembering that it is the eve of saint's day, kneels down in the snow, says the appointed collec and resolves to postpone the murder until the holy season i past, introduces us to a religion which is pre-Christian. Mauric Hindus, who really knows the Russian situation, contradicts ab solutely Stephen Graham's attractive picture of Russian pre revolutionary religion. The following extracts from *Humanit Uprooted*,* tell the tale of the downfall of a Christian Churc of which there are many in the last two thousand years, thoug perhaps none on such a scale. He quotes Archbishop Wedensky 'perhaps the most eloquent clergyman in Russia, and one of th most scholarly,' who said:

> 'The extraordinary Byzantine glitter of our Orthodox services ha been our greatest curse. Our church has striven after external gor geousness at the expense of inner virtue, after showy splendour at th cost of spiritual perfection. It acquired pomp, power, rites, but lost it soul. Only now are we beginning to realise what a feeble spiritual in fant our Orthodoxy has been. That is why it is disintegrating' (p. 23)

And the author adds:

> 'Too exclusively had the Orthodox church given itself to the pur suit of ceremonial and externalism' (p. 23).
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> 'It did not seek to fit into the varying mould of an expanding civilization with its power to stir new ideas, new questions in th

* Published by Jonathan Cape (1929).

human mind. It hardly heeded the challenge of science, the humanities, and the rising social movements. It hardly took cognizance of their existence' (pp. 23, 24).

'Self-doubt, self-criticism it vigilantly suppressed' (p. 24).

'The spiritual forces at work in the world outside its own confines it chose to ignore. Hence it never grew in spiritual stature. It had only its mechanistic mysticism to lean upon' (p. 24).

'The ministration of the Orthodox church had a sterilizing effect on the spiritual life of the peasant. It depended for its appeal, not on living sentiment, on understanding of the real purpose of faith and the meaning of service, but on miracle, magic, ceremonial. It had always emphasized the form rather than the substance, the technique rather than the spirit of worship' (p. 25).

'In its concrete manifestations the peasants' faith showed itself literally enough. It resolved itself into a calculated formalism, piously executed. He went to church, observed his numerous fasts, lighted candles before his favourite ikons, visited monks and saints who for a consideration could perform miracles . . .' (pp. 26, 27).

'Such a mechanistic conception of religion could not survive the shattering effects of the Revolution, with its fierce onslaught upon non-rationalistic faith and practice. His atrophied spirituality could not lift the peasant above the inconsistencies and contradictions which the Revolution had been hurling at him' (p. 27).

As we contemplate the disaster, we do it in no spirit of Pharaaic self-righteousness, but as those who listen to the Apostolic warning: 'Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall.' The late Sir William Ashley, when attending a notable Christian Conference, wrote to a friend:

'The Greek Orthodox ecclesiastics irritate me daily with their picturesque ineffectiveness.'

Some day that charge of 'picturesque ineffectiveness' may be made by the historian against a Church of England whose candlestick has been removed.

A Bishop and Divorce.

The following statement made by the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich on the extremely difficult problems connected with Divorce and Re-marriage deserves particular attention. Its judicial tone and comprehensive charity give it a weight which we could desire to attach to all episcopal pronouncements on this subject. The Bishop writes:

I was recently invited to interfere with my prohibition or at least my censure on an occasion when a divorced person desired to be remarried in Church. I do not think it would be right for me in any case to endeavour to interfere with the discretion which the law definitely gives to every parish priest; but unless the incumbent himself chooses

to consult me I am not disposed to express my views on any particular occasion which may arise. But every now and then I have to come to a decision myself upon the question, either because my opinion is sought, or because a licence is applied for. . . .

At the back of the minds of those who hold that under no circumstances whatever should a divorced person be married in Church, there is not, I am sure, any uncharitable harshness with respect to one who has been wronged, or to one who has done wrong, still less the thought that unfaithfulness to the marriage vow is of all sins the least forgiveable or the worst. It is partly a sense of the obligation of loyalty to what is supposed to be the mind of Christ, partly the determination for the sake of the well-being of society to uphold the sanctity of marriage, and with that sense of loyalty and that resolve no Christian person can do other than sympathize.

It is not, however, an easy question to determine how best this faithfulness may be promoted and maintained. The mere insistence on the inviolability of a rite can never secure it. If estrangement and unfaithfulness have come about, to treat the marriage as indissoluble might still be advisable for society as a whole, however severely it might bear on a particular case; but so to treat it does not in itself keep the marriage in question sacred, and it may have quite the opposite result. The two considerations which are obviously of the highest importance to Christian people, and would indeed be recognised as conclusive by most of us if we were quite sure about them, are, What does the Church hold? and above all, What does our Lord teach?

The teaching of the Church in general terms is quite explicit. The parties married take each other 'for better for worse till death do them part,' and the marriage is completed with the words of our Lord, 'Those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder.' If these words stood alone they would hardly however imply that no marriage is under any circumstances dissoluble. In fact they rest on the pledges of the parties concerned that they will 'keep them only unto the other so long as they both shall live,' that is, they presume the condition of faithfulness. They state what the marriage union is intended to and does imply; but they do not possess the power of binding to the implication, any more than the Confirmation vow of the renunciation of sin prevents sin. If one of the parties breaks the condition a new factor is introduced which demands a fresh consideration of the relations of those, one of whom has broken the pledge.

The Church has always had to face the entrance of this new factor, and from time to time, though with reluctance, has felt bound to acquiesce in divorce. The Roman Church by a process of annulment of marriage brings about a divorce — rarely and reluctantly I have no doubt; otherwise it consents to what is equivalent to a legal separation. At one time the Church of England pronounced sentence of divorce in the Ecclesiastical Courts, one of the conditions required being that security should be given for chaste living — a somewhat impossible thing to secure, as it seems to me, under the circumstances. The Act of 1857 transferred divorce to the Civil Courts and laid down certain conditions as to re-marriage in Church, that is to say, it left a limited discretion to the parish priest with respect to the guilty party, and under that authority the clergy have acted as it seemed to them right, sometimes with and sometimes without the expressed sanction of their Ecclesiastical superiors.

The more fundamental consideration however is whether our Lord did or did not prohibit divorce and re-marriage. His teaching as given in the Gospels of St. Mark and St. Luke appears on the face of it to be perfectly plain. There is the statement of the effect of the union, 'They are no more twain but one flesh,' the injunction 'What God hath joined together let not man put asunder'; and the consequence, 'Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another committeth adultery against her and if she herself shall put away her husband and marry another she committeth adultery.'

This, on a first reading, seems not only to declare marriage indissoluble but also definitely to prohibit re-marriage. But here again if nothing more were to be said as to the purport of the words they would not seem to me to carry the consequences suggested. They state the purpose and character of marriage; that is, the kind of union — faithful, life-long, indissoluble — that marriage is intended to be; but it still leaves the question open, what is to be done if indeed the claim of faithfulness is ignored and the marriage vow flouted? But St. Matthew inserts the important words of exception 'saving for the cause of fornication,' whereby divorce for adultery is expressly reserved. This exception occurs in the two passages in that Gospel, one in the Sermon on the Mount and the other in the 19th chapter, where the statement is in answer to the question of the Pharisees, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for *every cause?* To understand our Lord's teaching we must try to understand the circumstances to which it was addressed. Among those circumstances was the recognition of divorce as legitimate and on several grounds. The question of the extent of those grounds was evidently exercising the minds of men, and it was in view of this attitude that the Pharisees put their question. The answer, which apparently rejects other causes, allows that of adultery.

This qualification by St. Matthew clears up what may seem to be otherwise a rather curious way of putting the matter in the other Gospels. What is the precise force of the expression that if a man marries he makes his divorced wife an adulteress when by the statement of the case she is one already? This is not a strained criticism: it is pertinent. I feel sure it is only familiarity with the phrase that prevents the awkwardness of it in such an application being realised. It doesn't really fit the circumstance of adultery, whereas it does most aptly apply to the general conditions governing 'putting away' among the Jews at the time with adultery left out. The exception makes the precise form of words clear and appropriate. We have not then to interpret St. Matthew's words by those of St. Mark and St. Luke but find the necessary qualification of these last two gospels in St. Matthew.

But there is another and a more important consideration. Our Lord's teaching was always, as it seems to me, of the nature of giving principles and leaving His disciples to apply them to the very varied conditions of life. So in respect of marriage His purpose was to give the fundamental spiritual truth, the effect of which would be to build up a higher conception of the marriage relation and to encourage the ideal. With such a purpose and facing such conditions the recorded words have a different bearing. They are no more intended to be used as laws in a detailed sense to be applied in a literal way to the faulty conditions of human life than are other parts of His teaching, for example that on giving or on lending or on the disposition of property in general. They are intended to be principles on which Christian con-

duct is to be based and in the application of which consideration must be given to the conditions we find about us.

I find therefore nothing in divorce for adultery which is irreconcilable with Christian principles or contradictory of our Lord's teaching. Divorce seems to me to be the same thing in its result as the annulment of a marriage and to carry of necessity the right to marry again. If a marriage is annulled there can be no barrier to a subsequent marriage. The two things divorce and re-marriage go together in our Lord's teaching, and whatever qualification the words given by St. Matthew and the general character of the teaching imply in respect of divorce apply equally to re-marriage. Indeed I find it difficult to distinguish the status of parties after divorce lawfully pronounced and the status brought about by the death of one of the parties, where the right to marry again is not questioned, nor would be questioned even if the conduct of the person desiring to re-marry had been bad enough to contribute towards the death of the former partner.

But granted that divorced persons may re-marry, are we to accord to the second marriage the Church's blessing? To answer this simply and in all cases is, I admit, a difficulty, but I do not think we ought to shirk it by falling back on the Registry Office as an alternative available means. If to do this were intended to cover rejection of the right of re-marriage in every case on the ground that such re-marriage is against Christian law, clearly I could only express my entire disagreement. But the difficulty presents itself in another light as between the innocent and the guilty party, and especially when we reflect that there is such a thing as collusion and that legal guilt and innocence do not always correspond with actual guilt and innocence. Nevertheless I think the innocent party is always entitled to be married in Church. To refuse may be to act with great harshness to one whose bitter experience deserves nothing but sympathy and help. It is true there are cases when one cannot be sure who is really the innocent and who the guilty; but in acting on the judgment of the court we should only be doing what we all do day by day in countless cases. We can never go beyond the word and the outward evidence because no one but God really knows the heart. Something of the kind may be said to be implied in the case of marriage in general; and if it be urged that moral conditions are immaterial in the case of a first marriage but of vital consequence in the case of a second, I can only say that that kind of moral distinction is one that I cannot follow. If I do not hesitate to bless in every case of a first marriage, whatever the antecedents may have been, I certainly need not hesitate in the case of a person against whom no charge has been brought.

A licence is a rather different matter. It is a privilege; no hardship is necessarily involved in its refusal. Hence in the case of an application for a licence it does not seem to be unreasonable to require testimony that the parties concerned, or at least one of them, is a *bona fide* Churchman or Churchwoman, and that they are of good life and character.

So far with regard to the innocent party. The case of the guilty party is more difficult. Most Church people are apparently prepared to say that the guilty person at all events ought not under any circumstances to be married in Church, not because his sin is unforgiveable, nor because of all sins his is the worst, but because it cuts right across the essential conduct of true marriage, and for him therefore the ser-

vice would seem specially unreal; and still more perhaps because consent to the re-marriage of guilty persons 'as if it did not matter,' as the opinion would run, would indeed be to undermine the foundation of Christian marriage.

I do not find it possible to adopt so simple a line. If, as I think, Christian principles in their application to the conditions of life allow divorce on the ground of adultery, the possibility of re-marriage must be faced in the case of each of the parties and not only of the innocent one. To suppose that a person who has been divorced will if unmarried live a chaste life is less likely than in the case of the innocent partner. If so it is desirable that he should be married if he so desires, and to recognise the right is surely better than to contemplate further wrong. But in this case, with an admittedly broken marriage vow, there should certainly be some evidence of repentance and some kind of guarantee given by the general behaviour of the man and woman in question before the Church can be expected to give her sanction to the new union. It is for this reason, I presume, that the law gives discretion in such a case to the parish priest. If he finds it difficult to come to a decision, or if he sees no sufficient evidence of contrition and no guarantee for the future, it does not seem to me that there can be ground for complaint if he prefers to leave the parties to take the alternative course of a civil marriage. It may further be said that the actual form of our marriage service makes this the more appropriate course under such circumstances. I have hitherto, when counselled, advised in this direction, but I have not found in every case this conclusion an easy one to come to; and I am not prepared to say that in no case ought a person against whom a decree has been obtained to be married in Church, and I should certainly not be disposed to censure any incumbent who, in a review of all the circumstances as they were known to him, decided that it would be right for him to perform the marriage.

I have come to these conclusions with the deliberate conviction that to act on these lines will tend to help rather than hinder a true conception of what marriage ought to be. I am not moved by arguments about the thin end of the wedge or by references to the unhappy conditions which may be present in America. The conditions there, in that great country of mixed nationalities, are probably too imperfectly known to most of us to make a comparison other than misleading. We cannot build up a Kingdom of Righteousness by refusing to recognise failure and by avoiding measures by which to deal wisely with the various types of failure we meet with. The marriage law affords no exception to this necessity; and my opinion is that to treat marriage as indissoluble when the conditions on which its happiness and true qualities depend are broken is to place an obstacle in the way of that better view which we so greatly desire should prevail.

The New Spirit in Anglo-Catholicism.

Fr. Francis Underhill's new book, *The New Spirit in Anglo-Catholicism*,* combines the functions of an eirenicon and an apology. Its publisher asserts on its cover that

* Published by A. R. Mowbray, price 1/6 (1930).

> 'The aim of the book is to plead for a new attitude on the part of the official Church towards Anglo-Catholicism, and on the part of Anglo-Catholicism towards the rest of the Church of England, in view of the coming of a most serious crisis in the life of the Church.'

Fr. Underhill's effort is prompted by a realization of the great dangers we are in by our unhappy divisions, and also by the realization that although the Anglo-Catholic movement is about to complete a century of ardent propagandist work in the Church of England, yet it is clear that it is not going to succeed in winning the English nation to its ideals, even though it may have gained a temporary ascendancy within the Church. Fr. Underhill recognizes that it was the unpopularity of Anglo-Catholicism which caused the double rejection of the Deposited Book.

Yet the Anglo-Catholic party has worked very hard; it has exhibited great courage and cleverness; it has been ready to suffer for its principles; its leaders have in many cases been men of piety, culture, learning and humour. Nevertheless it has never been popular with the nation. From the outset it has been suspect. It has been generally believed that its final objective was to bring the Church of England under the dominion of the Pope—in short, undo the work of the Reformation. The fact that a large number of its ablest leaders and their followers have entered the Roman Church gave recurrent support to this interpretation of the Anglo-Catholic mission. Yet its mission, as seen by itself, was to Catholicize, not to Romanize, the English Church. Unfortunately there has been an increasing tendency in its ranks to identify Catholicism with Romanism. To the ordinary Englishman the only difference at present appears to be that the Anglo-Catholic priest marries and does not obey the Pope, whereas the Roman Catholic priest obeys the Pope and is not allowed to marry. If the movement had only been satisfied to stand uncompromisingly for liberal and reformed Catholicism, and had set its face firmly against the fictions of mediaeval and modern Romanism, it would have won the gratitude of the English Church as a whole; but the enchantments of that august and fascinating superstition, the Church of Rome, have bewitched the Anglo-Catholic movement and have betrayed it.

With great courage and moderation Fr. Underhill enumerates the causes which have, as he conceives, made Anglo-

Catholicism unpopular. First, of course, there is *misconception*. That is invariably present. Movements are like people: they believe that they only need to be better known and better understood to be better loved. Then there is *aggressiveness*. This charge may be dismissed also. Every vigorous and vital movement must be aggressive. Then there is the charge of *obscurantism*. This is unjust. The Anglo-Catholic leaders have been erudite men. The debt the English Church owes to *Lux Mundi* is very great. A number of scholarly theological works are contributed year by year by members of the Anglo-Catholic party. Its theology is conservative, but it has ceased to be mediaeval: its Biblical criticism is as advanced as that of the Modernists. Next comes the charge of *intolerance*. It is easier for a Modernist to be tolerant: the only people he cannot tolerate are the intolerant. 'The line,' we are told, 'must be drawn somewhere.' The contemporary Anglo-Catholic does not draw it nearly as close as his party drew it some years ago. All the more enlightened Anglo-Catholics are exhibiting an increasing tolerance. The next charge, that the Anglo-Catholic is *substituting an ecclesiastical system for Christ's Gospel* is a difficult one to meet by the upholder of institutions which he regards as the enshriners, not as the opponents, of Christian truth. The best Anglo-Catholics certainly regard all ecclesiastical institutions as means towards an end, not as ends in themselves, as do the worser Anglo-Catholics. Then, closely connected with this, is the charge that the Anglo-Catholic is unpopular because *he inculcates a sense of obligation*. This is not the same thing as a sense of duty. Duty is concerned with the fulfilment of the moral law: the sense of obligation is concerned with the observance of ecclesiastical regulations. These regulations are novelties to the majority of English Church folk, and are regarded by them as needless, or meticulous, or superstitious.

It is, however, the deep apprehension that Anglo-Catholicism is a Romanizing movement, and is fundamentally disloyal to the Reformation and to the English Church as reformed, which accounts for the very limited influence which it has had in winning the English people to its support. Its power in the Church today is considerable; its power in the country is small and is diminishing, and with its weakening the Church itself is weaken-

ing also, for in too many localities it has become identified with the Church of England itself. All who are not Anglo-Catholics have been driven off.

Fr. Underhill's book is significant; it would however be strengthened if he met the charge of Romanizing more strongly, and indicated where Anglo-Catholics draw the line between Catholicisim and Romanism. Is Rome their ultimate objective?

Questions for Reunionists.

The problem of Christian Reunion becomes more complicated as it is studied. Hence the Committee of the World Conference of Faith and Order has done well to issue a set of questions dealing with the theme. They are as follows:

1. What is the nature of the corporate unity at which we should aim? In particular, what is the relation of organic to federal unity? What different forms may federal unity take? How far and in what ways may any of these forms be (*a*) a substitute for organic unity, (*b*) a step toward organic unity, (*c*) a form of organic unity, (*d*) a supplement to partial organic unity?

2. How far is it possible to include within the one Church types of religious faith and worship as diverse as are represented by the Friends and the Anglo-Catholics? What more can be done than is now being done to interpret to one another the position of those who take a high sacramental view of religion and those who regard such a view as erroneous and *vice versa*? What help towards such better understanding could be given by a more intensive study of worship as distinct from faith and order?

3. Where apparently irreconcilable differences exist, what method of procedure offers the best hope of progress? How far and in what ways is it possible to supplement discussion by experiment? If the method of experiment is impracticable, is any alternative possible?

4. Pending complete organic union, how far and in what way is it possible to express the existing degree of spiritual unity among Christians in corporate acts of worship, witness, and work?

What are the reasons for or against

(*a*) in worship — a joint celebration of the Holy Communion on special occasions and under certain safeguards, or, a simultaneous celebration in different groups or places?

(*b*) in witness — joint evangelistic services on the basis of the Lausanne Report on the Message of the Church?

(*c*) in work — practical coöperation in social and moral questions along the lines of the various Commissions of the Stockholm Conference on Life and Work?

5. Is the suggestion made by the Ecumenical Patriarch 'that a League or Council of the Churches should be formed for practical purposes,' practicable or not? If so, under what conditions?

The Committee is reasonably optimistic as it observes the numerous movements for practical co-operation between widely separated Christian bodies both at home and abroad, but it rightly holds that Church union has only been realised when all Christians can unite in the Holy Communion.

> We note with gratitude to God the recent increase of effective coöperation in the mission field. The purpose of all missionary work is to carry the eternal Gospel to the ends of the earth, so that it may meet the spiritual needs of every nation and bring all men to the Saviour. Here more than anywhere else unity is essential. We note with sympathy the degree of union which has already been attained in many countries and the plans which are proposed for further union. We commend these plans to the churches for their careful consideration.
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> The demand which comes from the churches of the mission field is that the Churches at home should grant them greater freedom of action, and that their hopes of unity should not be frustrated by the long-continued acquiescence in disunion at home which makes it difficult to recognize how fatal disunion is to the new indigenous churches.
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> Complete fellowship in the Church will be realized only when the way is opened for all God's children to join in communion at the Lord's table. Through prayer and thoughtful deliberation the steps must be found which will most effectively lead to this goal. Ambiguous statements and hasty measures may hinder rather than hasten the work of unification. Yet if we are ever to become one, we must not shrink from the task. Some of us believe that full communion can be reached only at the end of the process of unification; others that it may be used by God as the means to that end.

The Committee appends the following useful note on the term federation when used in reference to organic union:

> There are some who believe that coöperation should take the form of federation, either local, national, or international: others oppose federation, fearing that it may become a substitute for complete organic union. In the interest of clarity of thought it is important to remember that the word 'federation' is used in at least three different senses. It may denote either
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> 1. A substitute for organic union.
> 2. A step on the road to organic union.
> 3. A form of organic union.
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> In discussing federation it is important to make clear in which of these different senses the word is used.

It used to be said that it was the clerical leaders of all denominations who kept the denominations apart. It is now becoming clear that the rank and file of the laity, conservative, prejudiced, indifferent, constitute a more serious barrier to reunion. Much more educational work is required. The efforts of the Committee of the World Conference of Faith and Order deserve increasing support.

WILL RELIGION REVIVE?*

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

HAD Swinburne been alive to-day, he would not have needed to write his *Vicisti Galilaee :*

> Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean,
> The world has grown grey at thy breath.

The world may have grown grey, but it is not at the touch of the Galilean; and if Swinburne wanted paganism, he would have found, had he been amongst us now, enough and to spare—though some of its manifestations would have appalled him.

The influence of religion in general, and of Christianity in particular, has waned faster than the most sanguine hopes of Swinburne could have led him to expect. It is true that bishops are asking for money to build churches, but the building of churches is rarely a good sign. Augustus built and endowed splendid temples when the traditional religion had begun to lose its hold, and the period of 'perpendicular' architecture, which covered England with noble parish churches, was, ecclesiastically speaking, the end of an epoch : mediaeval Catholicism was already undermined.

It is the emancipation of the industrial population from organised religion—indeed, from religion of any kind—that most forcibly strikes the observer to-day. Mr. C. E. M. Joad, in a work just published, gives the following statistics :

> 'We find that a comparison between records of church and chapel attendance in a typical London area with a population of over 80,000, at three different periods during the last sixty years, shows that in 1886-7 the total number of persons attending was 12,996, and the average attendance at 44 services was 295. In 1902-3 the total was 10,370, and the average at 56 services was 184. In 1927 the total was only 3,960, and the average at 62 services was 63. It is interesting to note that, as the numbers of the congregation have gone down, the number of the services has gone up.' [1]

But it is not only the proletariat that has emancipated itself from religion. Even the middle classes, which used to be the backbone of institutional religion, are drifting steadily—even rapidly—away, as any incumbent of a suburban parish could

* A paper read before the Bournemouth Branch of the M.C.U. on January 16th, 1930.

[1] *The Present and Future of Religion* (1930), p. 13.

testify. Sunday tennis and the motoring week-end have robbed many a church, which was pretty well filled before the war, of its congregation, and also (what is worse) of its Sunday School teachers and other parochial helpers.

The drift is not less manifest in the country than in the towns. For two Sundays in August of last year the writer took the duty at a pleasant village in the wilds of Dorset, well known to Hardy lovers. He was interested to observe that an enterprising charabanc proprietor had arranged Sunday trips to the seaside, which were well patronised. The internal combustion engine has revolutionized English religious life in country as well as town.

Thus our modern population, bourgeois as well as proletarian, is rapidly abandoning the practice of religious observance and holds very lightly by the traditions of the past.

Provided that substitutes for religion can be freely provided, such as commercialized sport subsidized by the gambling industry, inexpensive amusements, and a daily diet of sensation in the Press and on the screen, the greater part of the population will no doubt relegate religion to the limbo of outworn practices. And should there continue to be any demand for religion, it will have to be a 'history-less' cult — a religion of present-day marvel, such as Christian Science or some form of Spiritualism. Such cults will do what is required of them, *i.e.* deliver the goods, which will be of the health and wealth order. They flourish in America, where institutional religious life is weak and half-education universal.

It would be easy to expand reflections like these, but since the facts are not only well known, but actually accepted by religious authorities, it would be wearisome to labour the topic further. The circumstance upon which it is far more profitable to dwell is that there exists a growing revolt against the irreligious barbarism of the times — a revolt which will gather strength as the results and accompaniments of that barbarism become more evident.

Such revolts have taken place in the past. In the Victorian epoch, for example, Oscar Wilde satirized the tastes and habits of Caliban, though his protest was aesthetic, not ethical — since in his eyes ethical prepossessions were an unpardonable manner-

ism. In a sombre age he looked to the scarlet sin to contribute a colour element to the scheme of things. And even to-day the revolt is not primarily ethical. Our modern prophets are not sure that contemporary ethics are worth criticising any more than they are worth practising. The fact seems to be that the revolt which is beginning amongst us is neither (predominantly) aesthetic nor ethical, but *religious*.

It need hardly be said that the type of revival indicated has little in common with that species of delirium which used to be sporadic in parts of Wales. It will probably not at first attract much public attention; the seed sown will grow secretly amongst that section of the community which does not advertize itself.

At present there are in existence several factors which make a revival of religion far less improbable than most people imagine. In the first place, though this may not be the most important factor, there is the very considerable change of intellectual atmosphere which has taken place within the last generation. Not only are men of science adopting a more sympathetic attitude towards religion — an attitude which characterizes both physicists like Professor Whitehead and Dr. Eddington, and a biologist like Mr. Julian Huxley; it is equally noteworthy that a writer like Mr. Middleton Murry should seek to make up his religious accounts by writing two books to express his religious beliefs and experiences.

But the mere fact that religion has been made intellectually respectable is of no particular avail until a genuine need for religion is felt. Although it may be possible to embrace religion without committing intellectual suicide, yet unless there is some strong motive for embracing it, few people will go to so much trouble — or if they do, their religion will be a dilettante affair and not worthy of the name. Nevertheless the interesting thing to-day is not merely that intellectual inhibitions have been removed, but that in their stead has arisen a definite need for, and attraction towards, religion. Thus the absence of a negative influence has been reinforced by the emergence of a positive one. Apart from this further factor there would be small ground for expecting a revival of religion, for though intellectual difficulties will undoubtedly militate against religion, the absence of such difficulties will not suffice to bring it into existence and ensure

s vigorous life. For this there has to be some positive force at ork, and some strong need felt.

The situation would appear to be that the religious instinct hich for a considerable time has been striving to express itself a number of ways which have proved to be dead ends, is look- ng for new means of expression. That is to say, the religious eed is becoming conscious of itself as being a need for *religion* —and not for any of the things which it imagined to be its bject, which things proved to be either non-existent, or un- ttainable, or unworthy.

The first of the substitutes with which the religious instinct as been striving to satisfy itself, and which is now discredited, as been exclusive nationalism of an aggressive and militaristic ind. Although this religion may still prevail in Europe, and ay even be on the increase in certain parts of the world, it can o longer claim the uncritical allegiance of large sections of a ivilized community, in spite of its imposing and psychologic- lly effective ritual — flags, bands, ceremonial displays and so n. It may indeed revive; this depends on political conditions; ut at present it is under a cloud which seems hardly likely to ft. Recent war books have proved damaging to the orthodoxy f nationalism.

The next substitute for religion of which we may take ac- ount here is that evolutionary optimism characteristic of the ineteenth century, and tracing its descent from Rousseau by ay of Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Positivists. This religion f progress suffered heavily from the war; and a variety of other auses have contributed to render it obsolete. Amongst these we ay reckon the theories of human nature established by what is nown as the New Psychology, which does not regard human eings as naturally either moral or rational. Besides this, there the study of extinct civilizations and the causes which led to eir decline—a study which diminishes our sense of the security f our own civilization. There are also the biological sciences, specially the science of heredity known as genetics, which tend show that humanitarian legislation (in which the optimists of e last century placed such faith) may produce unforeseen con- equences of a disastrous character.

A further substitute for religion, which has perhaps claimed

more martyrs than all the others put together, is, as Mr. Aldou Huxley has pointed out, money-making and commercial succes This religion still flourishes in Europe and is easily the pre dominant cult in America, but in England at any rate its hey day is past. Although it is probably true, as Dr. Johnson saic that a man is rarely more harmlessly employed than when he i making money, yet a tendency now prevails to consider that t exalt business to the dignity of a religion (as was the habit o Victorian England) displays an inadequate sense of proportion Even apart from the fact that we no longer have a monopoly o commerce and industry, it would seem that in England a certai psychological change is taking place. Business has lost its ol sanctity; men devote themselves to it with divided minds, an only seek to make money in order to get out of it as quickly a they can.

The foregoing paragraphs are far from supplying a com plete analysis of our present attitude, but they may suffice t indicate that the gods of the recent past—*i.e.* the nation, human ity and money—are losing some of their hold on the community The younger generation, in particular, are not disposed to b slaves to them.

Thus it is not altogether extravagant to expect that durin the next ten or twenty years a considerable change of outloo may take place, at least amongst those sections of the publi which are capable of reflection. The idealism and loyalty whic have been elicited by, and freely bestowed upon, the old cult will have to find new and more satisfactory methods. The reli gious instinct—*i.e.* the instinct to devote oneself to somethin worthier and larger than oneself—will seek satisfaction in othe quarters than it has hitherto done.

The question for us, of course, is whether the Church wi prove to be a vehicle for the new spirit, or provide satisfaction for the religious need as it is now being felt. Has the Churc anything to give to these disappointed idealists, these tired an disillusioned men of affairs, these earnest sceptics and inquire —in a word, to these latter-day saints?

There is some ground for believing that the Church whic has most attraction for many of our disillusioned contemporarie is the Church of Rome. In England we have the propaganda o

Mr. Hilaire Belloc, whose *Survivals and New Arrivals* (1929) is a vigorous and trenchant analysis of the present religious position. Another book which has attracted widespread attention has been Mr. Christopher Dawson's *Progress and Religion* (1929), where the author traces in masterly fashion the secularization of Western culture, the rise of the Religion of Progress and its subsequent decline, leaving behind it the sequelae of intellectual disunion and moral disintegration. On the Continent we have able writers like M. Jacques Maritain, 'the lyrist of Thomism,' who in his recent work, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (1928), subjects to a critical analysis the spiritual founders of the modern age.

Books such as these (and there are others similarly inspired) voice a widespread feeling that the spiritual and moral health of the community demands a speedy return to a religion of authority—*i.e.* to Rome, 'the mother of Western civilization.' This gospel of a 'return,' ably preached and sedulously fostered as it is, is not one which the student of present tendencies can afford to overlook. He has to take stock of it, and either defy it or come to terms with it. He cannot afford not to understand it, or still less to imagine that this modern craving for a return to a stable and infallible authority in spiritual things does not exist. It may be a symptom of fear or of weariness, but, whatever be its cause, it is a prevalent attitude which characterizes not merely (as you would expect) the old and the naturally conservative, but the young and 'forward-looking.'

The fact seems to be that the large section of the rising generation which desires religion *has little use for a Church that does not know its own mind.* This is the real attraction of the Church of Rome. This is only another example of the truth that in the struggle for existence those individuals or institutions survive which are most sure of themselves. 'The Kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence and the violent take it by force.' 'To him that hath shall be given; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.'

There is a lesson here for Modernists. The Modernist who palters, or is uncertain, or tries to compromise, will fail, and deserves to do so. He who hesitates is lost. It is the 'all or nothing' men who win the world, for they set the pace and the rest have

to follow. In the coming struggle for the spiritual allegiance civilization, the Moderates will inevitably go down, and *je m'e crache* will be the world's verdict upon them.

Thus the religious revival which we envisage may take o of two directions. On the one hand, it may make terms wi authority: the revived spiritual life may enrich the Church Rome (for we need not reckon the Church of England as an thing but a feeble rival to Rome as an exponent of authoritati religion); or, on the other hand, the spiritual revival may tak its own line, and work out its own religious salvation in a ne way.

If it takes the latter course, as we hope it may, will it fin ready to hand a religious institution with a long history and rich tradition to be a vehicle of the new spirit? Will it find the Church of England a coadjutor of its ideals? That is to sa will that Church welcome invasion of itself by a horde of mor and religious free-thinkers? Can it absorb them and be invigo ated by them?

In this case, the Church of England should have a long an vigorous and lively future. Otherwise, it clearly can have non Its fate will be to be reabsorbed shortly by a Church whic knows its own mind and has an insatiable appetite.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS

AND ITS VALUE FOR MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

IN the vital age in which we live, with its restless activiti and ever-widening horizons, it is apparent that dogmat religion plays an increasingly unimportant part. A theolog which is out of harmony with a scientific outlook on life h driven many into unbelief.

We stand on the threshold of a new era, and in the welter outgrown and discarded opinions, are groping our way to needed readjustment. In so doing, we should not forget th there are torch-bearers of the past, whose flame, long obscure may yet with special fitness serve in some degree to throw lig on our present difficulties.

Of such is Plotinus, the great thinker of the third century A.D., of whose life and character we know more than of most historical characters living in an age so remote from our own, owing to the living portrait left to us by his disciple Porphyry, who wrote his life and edited his writings.

Plotinus appears to have been a man of feeble health, but penetrating mind: Porphyry tells us that he was 'of winning presence,' and that 'when speaking, his intellect visibly illumined his countenance.'

His integrity was so renowned that many orphan children were bequeathed to his care; his house was full of young boys and girls, and it is worthy of note that one, who was not only a philosopher but a mystic, and who himself lived the most abstemious of lives, should have proved himself, in their interests, an excellent man of business, until they were of age to choose or reject the philosophic life. An Egyptian by birth, he studied and taught in Alexandria for many years, migrating to Rome at the age of fifty-nine, and dying seven years later, in 270 A.D., in Campania, on the estate of one of his friends. He was greatly revered and greatly loved.

He became the founder of the Neo-Platonic School, ever acclaiming Plato as his master, but he was heir to the whole tradition of Greek Philosophy, deriving much also from his immediate predecessors, Numenius in particular.

Although he was engaged in controversy with the eclectic systems of Christian Gnosticism, the Synoptic Gospels were apparently not known to him. There are passages in the *Enneads* sounding like echoes of the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline Writings, but a direct contact is not necessarily to be inferred.

Posthumously, through St. Augustine and others he exercised much influence on Christian thought.

His system postulates a Divine Being, triune in nature, of whom the Universe is the visible expression. The highest aspect, or principle of this Trinity, is the 'One beyond Existence' in whom is ingathered in quiescence, all the as yet undifferentiated powers of the Cosmos, and from whom proceeds the Divine Mind, or Intelligence—the realm of Spirit, where unity is first merged in multiplicity, and all the archetypal ideas

are present from eternity. This second Hypostasis, or Principle, while remaining ever in communion with its source, in its turn gives birth to the Universal Soul—the creator of all that lies below the world of pure Spirit, and which contains, and in a sense *is*, all individual souls. The main emphasis of the teachings contained in the *Enneads* of Plotinus, is laid upon the identity of man, in his higher principles, with the Divine, and he portrays for us an eternal double process—the Universal Spirit descending through all stages and grades of being to the outermost limits of the world of form, and the separated soul, seeking, through aspiration and purification, the ascent to its Source.

For though Plotinus believed that the highest part of man was never entirely separated from that Source, like Plato, he mourns over its imprisonment in 'the Cavern' of the sensual life.

It is, however, considered as an essential part of the Divine Purpose, for 'the Soul herself would ignore what she possesses, if her faculties did not manifest themselves by procession.'

Potentiality must pass into manifestation to achieve full reality: the descent of the soul into the body is thus described:

> 'The Universal Soul shares the administration of the whole world without, however, entering into it, then, desiring to administer some portion of the world on her own responsibility, she separates and passes into a body.'

In this curious passage the idea seems to be implicit, that urged thereto by the need for self-expression, the Soul, forsaking it's own sphere of diffused, harmonious activity, descends *as essence* into the outer world of separation. In embodiment through experience, pain and struggle, and the awful responsibility of freewill (entailed by separation), *individuality* is achieved.

Keats, whose early death deprived the world not only of a great poet, but a profound thinker, expressed this idea very clearly in one of his letters[1]:

> '. . . What is his (man's) altered nature but his soul? And what was his soul before it came into the world, and had these provings and alterations and perfectionings? An intelligence without Identity. And how is this identity to be made? Through the medium of the Heart. And how is the Heart to become this medium but in a world of circumstance?'

[1] This was written in 1819, when he was 24.

For Plotinus, therefore, this isolation of the soul was only temporary, and possible at rare moments to transcend, whilst after death the aspiring spirit, freed from the trammels of the flesh, rises to ever closer degrees of union with the Infinite Life. It is an enhancement, not a cessation of consciousness that he would have us contemplate—a marvellous expansion in which the *essence of individuality* is never lost.

Plotinus himself experienced the state of ecstasy four times during his six years of association with Porphyry: this 'ecstatical Vision of God' was believed by him to be the supreme purpose of life, and he attempts in many passages of striking beauty to describe 'the flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she shall see face to face.'

In all ages there has been a tendency to regard mystical experience as an unpractical affair, having no bearing on the everyday life.

In this connection it is important to remember that throughout the system of Plotinus, it is consistently taught that the necessary corollary of spiritual contemplation is a spontaneous outpouring of creative activity.

Materialism, Scepticism, and Fatalism were the bugbears against which he brought all his armoury to bear. The Stoic doctrine of 'Causeless Origin' is strangely reminiscent of the scientific outlook of the nineteenth century. Life and consciousness were held to be the product of atomic energy, and the Soul of man, possessing no unifying principle, was believed, at death, to be dispersed with the chemical constituents of the body, and merged with the impersonal forces of the Universe.

Plotinus would have none of this: for him evolution without involution was unthinkable.

As within the seed lie enclosed all the potentialities of the perfected form, so from the One Spirit the manifested universe eternally burgeons forth as the expression of the Divine Thought.

Modern biology, while owning its immense debt to Darwin, could not afford to scoff at Plotinus.

'Natural Selection,' and 'Survival of the Fittest,' are no longer held to be complete explanations of the sweep of evolutionary forces. Modern scientific thought is being led to admit that behind visible nature there is a *directive* energy shaping to new ends.

That invisible working is thus described in the fifth *Ennead*: 'Proceeding from the superior powers as light radiates from the fire, it tames and fashions matter'—which irresistibly recalls the lines in Shelley's *Adonais*:

> ' . . . The one Spirit's plastic stress
> Sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there
> All new successions to the forms they wear,
> Torturing the unwilling dross that checks its flight,
> And bursting in its beauty and its might
> Through trees and beasts and men into the heaven's light.'

In upholding the possibility of finding ultimate truth, to the search of which his whole life was devoted, the attitude of Plotinus was in complete variance with the Scepticism of the New Academy. Against Fatalism he was equally insistent.

Heraclitus had taught (a doctrine assimilated by the Stoics) that the Universe was animated by one undifferentiated principle, the sole cause not only of life, but of all action, thus cutting at the very root of freedom. In combating this theory, Plotinus laid his finger upon the root of human endeavour, for freedom and individuality involve responsibility, and of this our philosopher would in no wise relieve humanity.

Many subjects which are under investigation to-day, such as telepathy, the various phases of psychic phenomena, and even the possibility of some sort of communication with the departed, find their place within his theory of an Universal Spirit, which, while retaining its independent existence, ensouls the phenomenal world. Man is equally a focus point in the Eternal Order during incarnation, and after the change which we name death.

In the *Enneads*, the Platonic conception of the Daemon, or Guardian, is largely developed, envisaged as a Power of the cosmic plane immediately above that of the soul to which it is attached. The physical and spiritual status of the individual is shown as determined by the character formed in the previous life on earth. There can be no doubt, to an impartial mind, that, so far as concerns man's existence on this planet, reincarnation, viewed as an educative process, is the key-note of the Neo-Platonic system.[2]

Plato himself did not directly put it forward as truth: that was never his method, but we know that he was an Initiate, and

[2] Whittaker, in *The Neo-Platonists*, gives due weight to the importance of this belief in the philosophy of the School.

that the doctrine, which came to Greece from the East, had been taught in the mysteries since the time of Pythagoras. The wonderful imagery of the Phaedo Myth, and the profound wisdom contained in the Vision of Er, were evidently presented by the Master as adumbrations of Reality, and as such were regarded by Plotinus.

This belief, undoubtedly, marks a real divergence from any phase of Christian theology, although in all ages there have been great minds, especially amongst the poets, which have found their way intuitively to it's acceptance. Both Origen and Clement of Alexandria believed in pre-existence, but even this teaching was dropped in the progressive crystallization of what finally came to be regarded as orthodoxy, and a conception of the soul as a new creation at the birth of the infant body, yet destined by its conduct, in a few score years, to an eternity of weal or woe, became the established tenet.

In the time of Plotinus, thought was still free, and religious speculation quite untrammelled.

The *intelligentsia* were not as yet attracted to Christianity, and the schools of philosophy were in the hands of pagan teachers. It was not until the following century, after the death of the Emperor Julian, that the growing power of the Church was able, by degrees, to impose an universal conformity of belief.

Classical culture was obscured for many centuries, and the murder of Hypatia, one of the last of the Neo-Platonists at Alexandria in 415 A.D., marked the growth of intolerance in the world of thought.

The teachings of Plotinus on the state of the soul after death approximate to Christian ideas of Heaven, Hell and Purgatory, but are clearly to be viewed as symbolizing spiritual conditions which have nothing of finality.[3] On quitting the body, he held that the soul sojourns for long periods of time—far exceeding the duration of a brief life on earth, in the environment appropriate to its needs. States of remedial suffering, of rest and refreshment, and of great joy, are respectively indicated for all

[3] The Sinning Soul 'wandereth alone and in great stress until certain times are accomplished.' The Sufferings in Tartarus are grim indeed, but they are terminable save for those who have wilfully and entirely cut themselves off from good.

except the wholly unrepentant, while those who are still imperfect must in due course seek re-embodiment, impelled by their own Higher Selves to seek the further experience necessary to their perfectioning. For the victorious and wholly purified spirits, all veils are lifted, and they pass beyond the scope of our limited vision. It has been the object of this brief paper to seek to discover if the thought of Plotinus can in any way help the modern mind to that outlook for which it is groping—one that may, indeed *must* transcend the faculty of intellect, but will not violate it. As in all religious and philosophical systems, there is much in his teachings that can be submitted to no external tests, and which therefore, from the scientific standpoint, must remain 'unproven.' Yet the main outline is not incompatible with such knowledge as we possess through the findings of modern research. His religion is independent of historical events, and the God whom he worshipped was not made in the likeness of man—the only qualifying word he uses to designate the Absolute is 'The Good.'

For him faith was no blind belief, but Vital Contact with an Universal Power more real than anything in the material world. In the sixth *Ennead* he speaks of it as 'an innate power analogous to that which flows from Him' (God).

He is wholly opposed to dualism; in a system in which evil, though fully acknowledged, is looked upon as a negation, or denial of Good, there is no place for a Personal Devil.

The salient feature of his writings is his fervent belief in the spiritual nature of the Universe, which he regards as a chain of interlinked existence, through which the Divine Life Stream ever flows, lying hidden, or buried, in the world of matter, but rising again in the Souls of purified humanity.

Sacrifice is the law of its awakening, *Via Lucis*, *Via Crucis*, but the emphasis is laid on the Light, not on the Cross. Through the eyes of Plotinus, religion is seen to be a greater and more inclusive, and yet a simpler, thing than men in their blindness and intolerance have chosen to recognize.

And whatever else in his teachings we may assimilate or reject, the essential message is not new. It is that 'God is all in all,' and that 'In Him we live, move and have our being.'

URSULA LOW.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE BY-PRODUCT

By the Rev. G. K. MacBean, B.A., The Manse, Penrith.

TWENTY-ODD years ago, in the Durham coalfield and other places where they make coke for blast-furnace purposes, the gases released in the process were carried by the smoke-stack into the air and lost. Nowadays all that has been changed. The old type of oven has been scrapped, and new plant has been installed for the purpose of making the escaping gases yield up the various substances they contain. These substances—such as ammonium sulphate, naphthaline, benzol, and many others—are called by-products, and the industry has been revolutionized in order to obtain them.

So valuable are these by-products that to call them by that name is not to disparage them; on the contrary, so highly are they esteemed that great capital expenditure has been made for the purpose of extracting them. They are by-products because that is the way they come to be. No question of value is involved in the name; simply one of genetics.

I.

And now, with that illustration in mind, let us consider the principle of the by-product in life. Briefly stated, it is just this, that there are some things in life, and these among the best, that we can only have as by-products, and that we fail most completely of getting them when we set our hearts directly on them. Often the best way to get them is to forget them, in the quest for something else. And the more genuine and disinterested our quest for that something else, the more surely will the by-product accrue, and in fuller measure and greater purity.

The eloquence of a speaker is a by-product, so valuable and so coveted that speakers sometimes aim at it. But the more they aim the more they are bound to fail. Carefully studied diction, pre-arranged vocal modulations, practised gestures, may produce an effect of artistry, but because it is the art that is not concealed it leaves the audience cold. True eloquence comes when no thought at all is given to it, as the by-product of passionate sincerity.

It was failure to recognise the principle of the by-product that kept alive longer than it deserved the theory of Utilitarianism or Psychological Hedonism in morals. Because pleasure accompanies the attainment of some particular end, therefore, it was assumed, pleasure was the motive for action towards that end; and because action cannot be thought of except as towards an end the attainment of which is pleasant, therefore, so it was argued, no other motives can be said to exist except the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The theory fails both ethically and psychologically, the former for obvious reasons, and the latter because, as a matter of common knowledge, he who deliberately aims at pleasure is pretty sure to miss it. Actually and psychologically, the pleasure is a by-product, and is only enjoyed when it supervenes on action undertaken towards some end disinterestedly sought.

The principle of the by-product is thus the touchstone by which we can test the rightness or wrongness of moral self-approval. Is it true that, as Dr. Fairbairn used to say, 'conscious righteousness is foster-brother to conscious sin'? Is it not the case that it is only so when right has been done, or is habitually done, in definite anticipation of the pleasing warmth that the sunshine of our own goodness imparts? Are we altogether to be denied the pleasure of a 'good conscience'? Does not the principle of the by-product throw light here? If when duty has been done for duty's sake, and, as the unsought by-product of the act, pleasure in having done it supervenes, this can surely only be the case because He who ordained the conditions of our moral life has willed it so.

II.

Our Lord applied the principle of the by-product on two outstanding occasions, first in reference to material blessings, and later in reference to spiritual. He saw that in obtaining the former men were going the wrong way to work. Because food and drink and clothing are the prime necessities of life, the argument of the world was then, as it is now, that they must be striven for with all one's might, for if each does not look after himself it is certain no one else will. Our Lord read this reasoning in men's hearts, and to Him there was something heathenish about it all. This absorption in material things betokened a

pagan view of life, entailing the loss of the best in return for so very little. And the cost in peace-destroying care and anxiety was so great. Without any doubt He saw other of the manifold evil effects of the world's philosophy of prudence and of its policy of grab and scramble, but it was the utter lack of trust in God that grieved Him. With His own assured belief in the Father's care it was all so needless and so pitiful. For Him the very fact that food and clothing are necessities of life disposed of all need for anxiety about them and their continued supply from day to day. Our Heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of all these things, and He will give us our portion of meat in due season.

In due season—and that will be when due order is observed, God's order and not man's, the order that puts the work before the wages, service before maintenance, and God's campaign for righteousness before the rations. It is the order of the Lord's Prayer: first God's Kingdom, and only after that our daily bread.

In other words, the main concern of life is to do God's will, to seek His Kingdom and His righteousness. And the things that men have made the prime object of their striving will be added in due course, by-products attached by the Heavenly Father's loving purpose to disinterested service of His cause.

In the world as God has made it and as He wills to rule it, that is the essential nexus between the material and the spiritual. In the economics of the Kingdom of God, the principle of the by-product rules.

III.

The second use our Lord makes of the principle of the by-product is in reference to spiritual blessings. Here again He saw men striving. Their aim is for something of far higher value than bread: of such exceeding value, indeed, that He recognizes it as the highest thing they can possess. He announces, moreover, that He is come that they may have it.

And if what the New Testament variously calls salvation and eternal life is our highest goal, are any pains to be spared that we may attain it? Ought not all lesser aims to be swallowed up in this great aim, and will it not be the function of a Saviour and Life-giver to assist us by His grace to persevere in its pursuit?

Nevertheless our Lord Jesus Christ did not take that way, or share that view of His saving mission. The last thing in the world He did was to bid men make their salvation the prime object of their endeavour. In language that is as strong as any He ever used, He declares that to do so is to fail. 'Whosoever will save his life shall lose it. Our salvation is not our affair, but God's. It is — startling paradox — a by-product.

Of what? we ask. Of doing the thing in life we were meant to do, the thing He Himself did so supremely, making the will of God our meat and drink, and losing ourselves utterly in the doing of it, committing ourselves in well-doing to a faithful Creator. With that self-committal, the issue is assured, and what remains for us is to be about our Father's business. 'Grace,' to quote one of Dr. Oman's antinomies, 'makes eternal life our only worthy and adequate goal, yet solely as God's end, and not as ours.'

IV.

The principle of the by-product thus removes a difficulty which on any austere theory of morals lurks in the New Testament use of the idea of reward. As a moral motive the desire for reward is inadmissible, and the faintest trace of its presence vitiates action. How then are we to understand the promise of 'great reward in Heaven'? How else save by the principle of the by-product? The great reward accrues to those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, not to those who merely profess to be righteous and who for the sake of the reward are prepared to face persecution. The reward is the by-product of righteousness, of genuinely disinterested righteousness, and as a by-product its bestowal is not only not calculated on, it may even cause surprise. The clearest instance of this is in the parable of the sheep and the goats, where the righteous plainly receive with wonderment something they had never counted on. If we wish, on the other hand, to learn what our Lord really thought of those who deliberately coveted reward, we find it in those caustic words 'Verily, I say unto you, they have their reward,' applied to those who sought recognition either from God or man. His words convey the suggestion 'they have their reward—for what it is worth,' leaving the impression that it is not worth much.

Similarly, light is thrown by the principle of the by-product

on some very noble words which, frankly, for all their stately majesty, do not quite bear their meaning on their face. When the Shorter Catechism tells us that man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever, what exactly does it mean? Has man really any other chief end than to glorify God? Could not the sentence, on strict New Testament principles, have ended there? *So far as the end man is to set himself is concerned*, it most certainly could have done so. *But God has an end for man as well*, and that end the Shorter Catechism calls 'enjoying Him for ever.' A grammarian would express the difference by saying that in the first half of the sentence the word 'man's' is the subjective genitive, and in the second half the objective. The first half contemplates man as rendering disinterested service to God; the second half defines the by-product which a gracious God has willed shall issue from that service.

V.

There is a theology waiting to be built up some day which shall rise four-square on the foundation that God's ways are other than man's ways, and God's thoughts than man's thoughts. It will treat the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ as something that by its very nature turns the world upside down. In such a theology, the principle of the by-product will come into its own.

THOUGHTS ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

'Though my own notions may be erroneous, I shall not have lost my time if I inspire better ones in others.' J. J. ROUSSEAU (*Emile*).

THE writer of this article ventures greatly daring to treat an aspect of the problem of evil. In doing so he assumes that the Christian conception of God is true, that He is perfect love and perfect wisdom, omniscient and omnipotent. The writer assumes also the immortality of the soul and the soundness of the monistic theology.

The thought underlying this article is the suggestion that there would have been no material life on earth for souls, unless it had been essential for the eternal welfare of each one of them that every soul should have the experience of evil before entering upon subsequent phases of eternal existence.

The theory may be formulated as follows:

God in creating souls with potential desire for good and evil, has placed them for an infinitesimal part of their existence in an earthly environment, by contact with which they will experience actual good and evil. God has done this with two ends in view, *viz.*: (1) that souls may learn through experience that evil, however pleasurable, is evil; and (2) that, having gained this knowledge, souls may be suitably equipped for their future existence throughout eternity. What then can be said in support of such an hypothesis?

There is the great fact of evil staring us in the face: none can escape it, whoever or wherever they may be. Why did the omnipotent God, to Whom evil is abhorrent, create souls with potential desire for evil, and place them in an environment where every soul would experience actual evil, both in its own being and in the world around?

The old, and even now not unusual answer, is that God did not intend evil to exist: it came contrary to His will. It is due to one man's free choice of evil when he was in a state of sinlessness. 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin.' The potential desire for evil with which every soul enters the world was held to be the result of that one man's choice. This answer supposes that the Omnipotent's designs have miscarried: His Own creation has thwarted Him. And, moreover, the result is precisely the same as it would have been if evil had come into existence by His decree: but, in the one case, it exists contrary to His will, and is purposeless; and, in the other, according to His Will, and as a means to a high end. This answer, which postulates a God lacking in both wisdom and power, and is moreover contrary to the findings of anthropology, will satisfy but few to-day.

We have no knowledge what will be the nature of the soul's existence after this life has terminated. But it seems reasonable to suppose that the soul will have functions corresponding to what we call 'thought' and 'action': if so, unless thought and action are imposed upon it from without, what is there to prevent the possibility of the soul indulging in wrong thought and wrong action? Angels are said to have erred in both thought and action in a purely spiritual manner. The soul's future happiness, usefulness, or even existence, may be imperilled, unless

t has gone through the experience of evil desire and learnt how evil it is. It is an incontrovertible fact that every soul does go through that experience. If such experience is necessary, would not Love grant it, though Love may suffer agony untold through the creation of such a terrible means as evil? Is it not at least as likely that God is ultimately the cause of the existence of evil as that, contrary to His Will, it has come into being through some other cause, so that now in spite of that Will, it looms larger and more menacing than any other thing affecting a soul on earth? Is evil the destroyer of God's creation, or is it a beneficent, temporary blot that will result in the completest perfection of souls that Love could devise, and that they could attain? The light affliction of evil, which (compared with eternity) is for the moment, *may* work for souls more and more exceedingly an eternal weight of glory.

The contention is that, if God is Love, and if the existence of evil is to be justified, then evil must be of some positive advantage to souls greater than the terrible disaster that it certainly is for them. Had it not been that souls are born into this world with a potential desire for evil, there might have been no necessity for the existence of actual evil. It has already been suggested that, for the supreme good of souls throughout eternity, the knowledge of evil is of prime importance, and furnishes the reason why God has put them with the potential desire for it into this short life.

The soul in the mundane sphere appears to be engaged, almost every instant of the day, in gratifying some desire, and then passing a judgment on the truth or value of the action involved in such gratification. Desire for work, desire for recreation : desire for exercise, desire for repose : desire for getting or spending : desire for food or health : desire for knowledge or power : desire to please man, desire to please God. The judgment quickly follows : The action was pleasant, interesting, worth while, satisfactory, beneficial, good, pleasing to God or to man : or else, it was disagreeable, a waste of time, unsatisfactory, mean, immoral, displeasing to God, hurtful to man, and so on.

Is all this gratification of desire, and are all these judgments of value, which make up the greater part of life, purposeless? Have they no meaning or use? It is suggested that, through

them, every soul is learning to distinguish the good from the bad, and to approve the one and to hate the other: and that, when the soul parts with its body and its earthly environment, the memory of these judgments of value will be its eternal possession, and an essential factor in the realization of its God-determined existence.

In a recent article in the *Hibbert Journal* (Vol. XXVIII, p. 203) it is suggested that evil may be a permanent condition of souls after death.

> 'Just as the reward of goodness is the opportunity for further development along the same lines, so the retribution of evil is the opportunity of further evil.'

The purpose of this article is to represent the earthly training of souls as designed to prevent any such calamity happening to a soul. We talk of the realization that evil is evil: but can we even conceive of the horror of what that realization may mean to souls as they begin to understand what evil is in the sight of God? May we not hope that this realization will be, in God's Providence, the efficient means of equipping souls against all possible forms of evil throughout eternity?

It may perhaps be thought that it would be incongruous for Love to plunge every soul *nolens volens* into the foul waters of evil from which it would necessarily emerge polluted and defaced. Is not the answer to this objection that Love will not leave souls stained for ever by contamination with evil, but will provide purification for them in a future state of existence? Signs are not wanting that purification begins even during their incarnated state for those souls that have learnt their lesson—signs such as repentance, contrition, conversion. Others die and have apparently learnt nothing. Experience, however, and the true understanding of that experience, are vastly different matters. May not the eyes of all souls be opened after they have parted with their body and the Light breaks in upon them?

It will be noticed that a fundamental idea underlying the subject of this article is that there is one definite Purpose only in respect of which mankind is incarnated, *viz.*: That every soul shall experience evil at the commencement of its existence. This idea does not preclude the conception that God has also other purposes for souls during their earthly life, running concur-

rently, as it were, with His main purpose, such as the making of character and the striving of souls to find Him out and do His Will. But does the brevity of man's terrestrial life cohere with the idea that such Purposes as these last account for his incarnation? Can character-building be completed in seventy years—or even in 7,000 years? Is an eternity sufficient to find out God and to do His Will? But seventy years of the experience of evil! Should we not feel, 'It is enough: Now, O Lord, take away my life!'

If the theory of evil presented above is to win support, it should of course possess both internal coherence and coherence with external facts. Can it be said that it has this desideratum?

The fundamental conception of God must be the supreme test. Perhaps it is better to leave it to theologians to pronounce judgment as to whether this theory will pass that test. But a layman may be permitted to point out other merits which he suggests the theory possesses.

It may be said that it gives at least an intelligible reason for the existence of evil, which without dispute requires more justification than anything that affects mankind. Moreover, the reason assigned introduces no dualism into the universe. The reason alleged is an optimistic one; and optimism is desirable if it can be defended. The theory further gives, it is hoped, not only an intelligible reason for the mundane life of man, but also a reason why that mundane life is but a small fragment of his existence compared with eternity, so short indeed that it would appear to be useless for the completion of any other psychological process.

Is it possible that we place too much importance on our status during our earthly life? It gratifies us to think that when we die we are fully-grown souls. The making of a crystal may take aeons, but for an eternal spirit seventy years suffices!

Perhaps each of us, when we die, may be compared to newly-born infants who, like Achilles, have been plunged into a Stygian bath—a most unpleasant one truly—but one designed like his to protect us from future calamity. When we understand what our baptism of evil has done for us, shall we not in adoring thankfulness confess, 'God has done all things well'?

'That's what all the blessed evil's for.' G. A. Byron.

BOOK REVIEWS

MIND AT THE CROSSWAYS*

Professor Lloyd Morgan has written a worthy successor to his two earlier books, *Emergent Evolution*, and *Life, Mind and Spirit*. The third of the series begins and ends with a discussion of agency, defined as action with some end in view. The conception of agency is used both in regard to human conduct, and to the divine ordering of the whole evolutionary process. 'One may make bold to say,' he writes, 'every step in the constructive advance of nature; every hierarchical stage in the process of natural fellowship; every phase of emergent evolution is also the expression of God's creative activity.'

A long road has been travelled before this quotation is reached. The central portion of the book deals with the subject of epistemology, regarded from an evolutionary or genetic standpoint; and it is in dealing with this central theme that the phrase chosen for the title of the book is used. The book may speak for itself as to the meaning of its title. 'In conclusion let me say what led me to choose *Mind at the Crossways* as the title of the book. First in scientific regard . . . If guidance of action, and nothing less, be accepted as the criterion of mind, the mind in this sense, the most usual sense, does stand at a crossing, namely, at the emergent passage from percipience to perception. If it be said that mind is present only when there is control of conduct with ends in view, then, in this sense also, mind stands at a crossway. It stands at the emergent switchpoint of divergence from the ascending line of perception to a new and higher line of ascent, which comes on the scene with the advent of reflection. The crossways are the switchpoints of new mental departure under emergent evolution . . . In man the creativity of Spirit finds expression only along the path that ascends from the emergent crossway at which the sign-post points 'to reflective procedure.' But in the language of symbolism God stands at all emergent crossways. All instances of emergent advance are in dramatic regard the expression of Divine Purpose.'

This long quotation, while it summarises well the two-fold theme of the book, may also show that in quality of style the book is not altogether easy. As in his earlier works, the author is at pains as he proceeds to specialise old words, and sometimes to coin new words, so as to give to his language a precise meaning which will accord with his system of thought. This specialisation of terminology makes for clarity, but it also makes a demand for thorough reorientation of mind on the part of those who would follow; and such a demand on the part of a teacher may tend to lessen the following which is his due.

The two earlier books of Professor Lloyd Morgan raised the very interesting question of the relation of evolutionary philosophy to epistemology, a question to which this book of the three gives the most developed answer. The student of classical English philosophy is trained to regard Mind as given, and as set over against the natural order as also given. From this dualism there arises the problem of the nature of perception, which bridges in some way the gulf between mental subject and physical object; and there follows the transference by Locke and Berkeley of secondary and primary qualities from the objective to the subjective side of

* *Mind at the Crossways*. By C. Lloyd Morgan, D.Sc., Ll.D., F.R.S. (Williams & Norgate, 1929. Pages xi + 275. 10/6.)

the gulf. The problem of epistemology is raised over again, in a form which is at first sight at any rate new, when it is realized, first that mind is not set over against the natural order, but is itself a member of that order; and second that mind is not a static given, but is rather the product of the long process of natural evolution. The field is open for a new enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which shall start not from present experience, but with an account of the evolutionary genesis of present modes of knowledge.

One of these two new principles of enquiry Professor Lloyd Morgan, in this as in his earlier books, leaves in much its old form. He does not regard Mind as emergent from the non-mental in the natural order; 'there is no emergent step from the physical to the mental'; within the new conception of evolution he follows the old principle of Spinoza, and regards mind as concomitant with the non-mental at every stage of the natural process. In this book he is concerned almost entirely with the mental aspect of nature; in contrast with neo-realist theories of direct apprehension, he regards the object itself as mental; but he gives periodic reminders that side by side with his account of mental development, there would be a concomitant physical and biological story of that which he is describing from the mental side. This unrestricted and universal concomitance suggests, here as in the earlier books, obvious difficulties and questions. If the object is mental, what ground have we for preserving a non-mental concomitant? May we not say that the mental only is real, and the non-mental non-existent, abolishing the physical concomitant from the new philosophy, as the old philosophy abolished first substance, and then the thing in itself? Professor Lloyd Morgan might reply, first that 'reality as the object of belief is that which is not susceptible of proof,' and then that '*I acknowledge* the existence of a physical world, but if you demand of me proof of its existence independently of me, I can give you none.' Granted the universal concomitance, the question then might arise, whether it is possible to preserve freedom, and purposive guidance in the mental world, when that world is concomitant with a physical world governed by rigid law? Here no doubt Professor Lloyd Morgan would agree with General Smuts, when the latter writes (*Holism*, p. 316): 'It is a profound mistake to look for Freedom only in the human will; Freedom has its roots deep down in the foundations and constitution of the universe.' He writes himself: 'Freedom and emergence have at least this in common. They stand for indeterminism when and where they obtain. They stand for a denial of the dogma: *All* that was, is and shall be is rigidly determined.' There is still left a further and even more important question, whether the presence of a physical concomitant is always and everywhere a necessity for mind? If so, does Professor Lloyd Morgan's system give a theory of theism with one hand, and with the other take away the possibility of belief in a world of transcendent spirit, which is a necessary corollary of that theism? Does the progressive disintegration of the physical world, whether in the case of the body of the individual or in the case of the whole world process, imply the concomitant disintegration of mind?—and spirit?

The second new evolutionary principle behind epistemology, the view of mind on its side as emergent and evolving, Professor Lloyd Morgan does accept whole-heartedly; and perhaps the most interesting part of this very interesting book is the consequent revision of the theory of perception and of reflection. He points out that common-sense (and, we may say, in general pre-evolutionary philosophy) starts from a world which is already through and through transformed by reflection, and on this basis considers perception; in point of genesis perception is, however, prior to reflection, and if

we would understand its nature, we must endeavour to strip ourselves of all that reflection has contributed to our objective world. Perhaps it will be most useful to give at this point, without argument, the stages of knowledge, as they appear in this book under evolutionary regard.

The lowest stage, which may be illustrated from the mind of a young chicken, or a newly-born baby, is characterized as 'action without guidance,' and as 'percipience,' as distinct from perception. At one point this stage is equated with instinct. At this level there is no 'there' or 'then'; there is awareness, but there is not awareness of a distinct object.

The next stage is characterized as 'perceptive behaviour,' and it is suggested that it may be equated with intelligence. In ordinary use perception is more or less tinged with reflection, and this must be eliminated, if perception is to be strictly understood. For perception there is 'thereness' and 'thenness,' but there is no 'before' or 'after.' The passage from percipience to perception is emergent, and of course the mental passage has its physical concomitant. The passage takes place through behaviour; behaviour is prior to, not subsequent to knowledge; a relevant instance of this behaviour is the motion of the eye in focussing, or in moving from one object to another, as a result of which there comes the 'thereness' of perception. Further, the passage takes place as the result of the 'cross-over' from one sensory field of percipience to another; here lies the emergent step of mind at the cross-roads, when for instance instead of the taste only of an object leading to its ejection, the sight of the object leads by a mental (and physical) cross-road to 'fore-taste,' and the object is avoided. With perceptive behaviour there is, as the word 'fore-taste' suggests, reversal of order; though in the first instance behaviour leads to perception, in ensuing instances perception, or rather 'fore-experience,' leads to behaviour. This 'fore-experience' is a fact of present experience, it is not on the perceptive level a conscious looking to the future; it is, however, such as to make it justifiable to speak of guidance in action on the perceptive level. In the untransformed world of naïve perception there is as yet no truth or error; each object is simply as fact that which it appears to be.

The third stage, implying further concomitant emergence, is characterized as 'reflective procedure' and equated with reason. There is a further, much more complicated series of 'cross-over' involved in the attainment of this level. Once it is attained, by a further reversal of order, knowledge first won by behaviour serves then as a 'fore-plan' to guide behaviour. In the world as transformed by reflection there is the conception of past and future, so that there can be reference to the future of an end in view. This third stage, as we know it in ourselves, does not supersede, but includes the earlier stages. In all the three respects there is continued development.

Such in brief is the epistemological theory developed in the book. What now of 'agency'? It may be thought that we have left rather far away the introductory theme of agency; and it is indeed the impression of a first reading of the book itself, that the conception of agency is introduced, and then given a somewhat inadequate development. The earlier books, developing the theme of concomitant emergent evolution, left as a problem requiring further development the revision of the theory of knowledge, relative to the evolution of mind. It may be suggested that this book, while taking up the problem of the relation of mind to the natural order, in its turn leaves for later more clear development the problem of the relation of personal agency to the natural world. Certain points are clear. In order that the world may be viewed in terms of agency, human and divine, there is a further dramatic transformation of the world, as there has been a reflective transformation of the world of naïve perception. Whereas so far the world

has been *interpreted* in mental regard, now the world is *explained* in dramatic regard. Agency is not, however, as might be supposed, a fourth level in the emergent scale; it is a different way of viewing all levels, such that God appears agent in each creative step. The question arises whether, if agency itself be not emergent, the power to regard the world as under agency is emergent, or is a special form of reflection? At times it would appear that agency introduces a second concomitance; as the mental story of the world is throughout the natural order concomitant with a life story, so there is a story in terms of divine, and at a point of human agency, concomitant with the two-fold natural order of life and mind. 'There are two ways of accounting for anything that happens; that in accordance with scientific method, and that which attributes its occurrence to the acts of some agent or agents. I asked leave to speak of the latter as dramatic explanation. With regard to anything that happens, then, the question arises in each one of us who pauses to think: In which of these two ways is *this* to be accounted for? The reply which I give to this question is: Always, and in any given instance, *in both ways*.' There is just a hint at the end of the book that to regard divine agency as thus concomitant with the whole natural order raises in an acute form the problem of evil. Moreover, as earlier the question was raised whether the presence of a physical concomitant was always and everywhere a necessity for mind, so now the question arises whether the presence of a natural concomitant is always and everywhere a necessity for a personal agent, human or divine. If so, religion would be deprived of a transcendent world of spirit, and science might say that it could account for the world well enough by its method, and did not need the hypothesis of the concomitant agency of God. Does the agent, divine or human, change the course of natural events; is there interaction between the world of agency and the natural order; if so, can an account of the natural order be given by the scientific method alone, leaving on one side a wholly separate, if concomitant, account of the events in dramatic regard; if not, what is the justification for speaking of agency with regard to natural events? As a modern Berkeley might eliminate matter from the matter-mind concomitance, so a modern Hume might eliminate God from the God-nature concomitance. These are questions which one may hope to see treated in a fourth book, which shall develop more fully Professor Lloyd Morgan's view of God's creative activity, in dramatic regard, with the same brilliant analysis with which this book treats of the world in mental regard.

GEOFFREY ALLEN.

WHO MOVED THE STONE?*

The subject of this book is that subsidiary phenomenon which in the Gospels is related in connection with the story of the Resurrection — the Empty Tomb. Mr. Morison does not state a thesis and proceed to demonstrate its reasonableness; indeed, he protests that the issue of his study is contrary to his anticipations. None the less from the finished work a connected argument may be extracted which, with omissions but (I think) without unfairness, may be summarized as follows:

> At the Trial of Jesus before Caiaphas it was testified against Him that He had said 'I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands.' It is remarkable that, in a trial noted for its illegality, this charge which involved sorcery and sacrilege and which, if substantiated, was sufficient to justify *Jewish* sentence of death, should nevertheless have broken down. This 'false witness' was unsatisfactory because Jesus had not

* *Who Moved the Stone?* By Frank Morison. (Faber & Faber, Ltd. Price 7/-.)

actually said what He was represented to say: yet it had its origin in words used by Him. Mr. Morison thinks the Fourth Gospel gives the real clue when, in reporting the saying 'Destroy this temple,' the author adds 'but he spake of the temple of his body.' 'He said in effect: "If you kill me, I will rise again from the grave."' The first eight verses of *Mark* may be relied on as evidence for the events they record. The women—three or four of them—came to the tomb, found the stone removed, the body of Jesus missing, and a young man inside the tomb who spoke the recorded message which *the women,* in their fright, may not have heard. Though at first they said nothing of their experience, it was not long before they spoke of it. Mr. Morison thinks they did so on the same day, as the Fourth Gospel relates, but this is not essential to his argument. The women did not mistake the tomb, as Dr. Lake suggested, and unless it was empty it is incredible that when the disciples preached the Resurrection their opponents should not have successfully confronted them with the true facts. A substratum of historical fact underlies the Matthean story of the guard placed at the tomb. Neither the Roman nor the Jewish authorities would have risked the possibility of disturbances arising during the Feast over the body of an executed pretender to Messiahship. That the guard story arose to meet a need of later Christian apologetic is dismissed on the ground that *a sleeping guard* would *not* have met the need. 'As dawn approached . . . something happened (Mr. Morison suggests an Appearance to "the servant of the priest," of which a trace survives in the Apocryphal Gospel of the Hebrews), which caused one of the watchers hurriedly to awaken his companions, and proceed to a closer inspection of the tomb.' This explains how the stone was moved away, and why the women found it so. The tomb was empty, and the guards went immediately into the city and reported the occurrence. The 'young man,' whom the women found in the tomb, heard of it and hurried at once to the place, arriving only shortly before the women. This young man was thus not a supernatural visitant, but none other than he who fled away naked at the arrest of Jesus in Gethsemane. His message, 'He goeth before you into Galilee: there shall ye see him, as he said unto you,' is explained by the fact that this same young man, according to *Mark,* is said to have 'followed with' Jesus on the way to the Mount of Olives and probably heard the words which were then spoken: 'Howbeit after I am raised up, I will go before you into Galilee.' The fact that the discovery of the Empty Tomb is not referred to in the preaching of *Acts* nor by St. Paul is explained not only because it was of no apologetic value (for there is not a trace of any dispute about the *vacancy* of the tomb), but also because the confession that women were at the tomb early on that morning would have lent colour to the Jewish charge that the disciples removed the body,

It will be clear to our readers that Mr. Morison has a very ingenious mind, and in fact his story is unfolded in such a manner as to make his book extremely interesting. To the familiar *evidence* in favour of the Empty Tomb he adds nothing. Explanations alternative to its acceptance have very serious difficulties. The most plausible is that put forward by Dr. Kirsopp Lake and repeated, with little modification, by P. Gardner-Smith. It is that the women really went to the wrong tomb, an open one, and that the young man, probably the gardener, spoke the first part of the message recorded in *Mark,* except 'He is risen' (a single word in the Greek)—that is to say, he indicated the right tomb. The women fled in terror at the discovery of their errand and said nothing for some weeks

until the disciples returned to Jerusalem, brought back by the Appearances in Galilee. Mr. Morison's criticisms of this theory are much to the point:

> 'In the first place, the evidence for the supposed absence or inaccessibility of the disciples on Easter Sunday . . . seems to me to be of a very doubtful and precarious character. . . . Not only does St. Mark (xvi, 7—the message of the young man) himself expressly imply the presence of the disciples, but the whole Synoptic tradition asserts and implies it too. . . . Prof. Lake is compelled to keep the women in Jerusalem until Sunday morning, because he firmly believes that they really went to the tomb. He is also compelled to get the disciples out of Jerusalem before sunrise on Sunday because he holds that the women kept silence.' To harmonize this 'he finds it necessary to keep the women in Jerusalem for several weeks while the disciples returned to their homes, had certain experiences, and came back to the capital.'

And again:

> 'Caiaphas and his friends must have been very different men from what we take them for if they did not see instantly that the supreme answer to all this nonsense about an empty grave was *to produce the gardener*.'

The issues of the controversy about the Empty Tomb seem to be either the acceptance of it as a fact, or the view that even the earliest Gospel is on this matter quite unreliable. If we choose the second alternative, then we must choose between believing that the early Christians and their opponents, equally with ourselves, never supposed the Resurrection *necessarily* to imply that the tomb was empty, and that therefore there was no need either to assert it or to refute it until cruder beliefs arose, or else believing that as the Resurrection was apparently not publicly preached for seven weeks, it was then quite impossible to prove that the tomb was *not* empty, either because it could not be accurately located, or because the earthly remains of Jesus could then no longer be identified.

The fact that, apparently from the first, the Resurrection was dated 'on the third day' is not, in my judgment, adequately explained as deduced 'from the (O.T.) Scriptures.' The passages in *Hosea* and in *Jonah* are too obscure and their Christian interpretation too far-fetched to have *created* the belief, though they may well have been lighted upon in the search for predictive prophecy of something which had come to be believed on other grounds. For the creation of the traditional belief the Appearances, if they began on the third day, would be more effective than the discovery of the Empty Tomb which, as the Fourth Gospel testifies, only suggested the removal of the body.

Much of Mr. Morison's reconstruction is too imaginative and ingenious to carry conviction. As a whole, the most we can say of it is that, as a theory, it is not impossible. He very strangely sees in the lack of evidence of veneration of the tomb of Jesus a confirmation of the story of the Empty Tomb. But it is just as strange if the tomb was found to be empty. The later Church would certainly have made a shrine of the scene of the Resurrection. Again, his explanation of the apparently sudden determination on the part of the priests to arrest Jesus suggests a curious mentality. He thinks they feared Jesus might prove to be 'unarrestable,' until Judas, from the Upper Room, brought word that Jesus was expecting arrest, and in a mood to submit! But Mr. Morison has produced a remarkable study of the last seven days of the life of Jesus. It is well written, though the author not infrequently gives the impression that he is consciously attempting verbal artistry.

J. S. Bezzant.

NOT AS NEW AS IT SEEMS.*

The Editor of *The Hibbert Journal* some years ago wrote a little book with the attractive title *The Lost Radiance of the Christian Religion.* It is some of this lost radiance that Christian Science has re-captured. It has captured it not by its methods of Biblical exegesis, which are grotesque; nor by its metaphysic, which is incredible; but by its recovery of the attitude of Jesus Christ towards sickness and sin. His attitude was not that which has too often characterized His followers. His religion was joyous and robust; He refused to make it ascetic, as was that of the Pharisees and John the Baptist. He urged that men should free themselves from anxiety about earthly cares: that they should seek first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness, and that all things needful for this life would be added unto them. His followers of a later age called Him 'the Man of Sorrows,' but there was nothing depressed or woebegone in His general attitude towards life. He believed in a Divine Father of Infinite Goodness: He believed also in the advent and triumph of the Kingdom of God. Only once in His hour of agony does His faith seem to have failed momentarily. Stern and indignant He could be, but for the most part His strong faith in God and intense moral insight were combined with cheerfulness. Humour, kindliness, an absence of formality, a detestation of obvious religiosity, a genial healthy-mindedness which enabled Him to share in social pleasures and human relationships, were His characteristics. It is of great importance to notice His attitude towards sin: it shocked His religious and legally-minded contemporaries. He associated freely with people belonging to the sinful classes, but when so doing He does not appear to have talked to them of their sinfulness. It is true that He said there was more joy in heaven over one sinner that repented than over ninety and nine just persons that needed no repentance—yet He does not seem to have stressed the sinfulness of human nature: He teaches nothing about original sin: He declares that those who wish their sins forgiven must forgive others: that those who love much are forgiven much: that the penitent and not the self-righteous obtain the Divine Absolution. The word 'Repent,' on His lips, is not 'Be sorry for your sins,' but 'Change your mind,' 'Cultivate a fresh outlook,' 'Turn over a new leaf.' It is an exhortation not to be sorry for the past, but to have hope for the future, somewhat in the spirit of such a verse as this:

> 'Every day is a fresh beginning,
> Every morn is a life made new,
> An end of sorrow, an end of sinning,
> Here is a beautiful hope for you.'

It is not the sinfulness of sin, nor the sinfulness of sinners, that He stresses, but the way to be relieved of the burden of sin. Perhaps no utterance of His expresses more deeply the character of His teaching than the words: 'Come unto Me, all ye who are weary and heavy laden . . . and ye shall find rest for your souls.'

Another aspect of His teaching was His recognition of the power of faith to heal disase. Whether any before Him had realised the power of mind over body, we cannot say. In this, as in many other matters, He appears to have been original. Many believed in cure by exorcism: the driving forth of demons by using a formula containing a name by which the demons were compelled to obedience. There is no evidence that our Lord exorcised, or relied on any incantation: He spoke, in other cases, He

* *Our New Religion.* An Examination of Christian Science. By the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher, F.R.S. (Ernest Benn, 1929. Price 6/-.)

uched, but He seems to have recognized that it was the sufferer's faith, the faith of those around him, which was the agency of the cure. His ual formula of dismissal of the person cured was: 'Thy faith hath healed ee; go in peace.' In conjunction with this recogntion of the power of ith was combined the conviction that sickness was not inflicted by the ivine Will.

It is these aspects of the Spirit and Gospel of Jesus which Christian cience has in some measure re-captured. It is true that it has combined em with absurdities, but in this world the good triumphs over the evil, nd so in Christian Science the truth in it triumphs over the falsehood in . Besides, people may be the users of false formulae, but not their slaves. ou can have a falsehood on your lips, but truth in your soul, and *vice ersa*. The falsehood in Christian Science appears to be mainly speculative. ir James Stephen, the grandfather of the Warden of New College, in his o little read *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, writes of some 'who asoned absurdly,' but whose hearts were the shrines of Divine Love. oubtless this is true of many Christian Scientists.

Mr. Fisher's book, *Our New Religion: An Examination of Christian cience*, consists of three parts: The Prophetess, the Creed, and the hurch. He treats the character and career of the Prophetess with sardonic umour. His estimate of her is summed up in the following paragraph:

> 'It is vain to represent a great woman of affairs as a sweet sentimental figure. In this rough world sweetness and sentiment do not build organizations and amass fortunes. Florence Nightingale, a far nobler figure than Mrs. Eddy, was not altogether the amiable, tender creature of the Victorian legend, but, as Jowett once described her, "very violent," and equally violent and compelling was the will of the woman who founded the Christian Science Church' (p. 78).

Of her Creed he say: 'The doctrine of mind-cure, so far from being eculiar to Mrs. Eddy, has always, and in every generation, entered as an lement into the wisdom of the wise' (p. 97). Is this really historically orrect? Was it known before Christ?

Of her Church, he writes:

> 'In one gift only was the Mother Church lacking. By a series of crafty machinations it had been wholly deprived of liberty. The land upon which the church stood had been acquired by Mrs. Eddy: the fabric was the property of Mrs. Eddy: the governing corporation was named by Mrs. Eddy' (p. 131).

Yet the religion of Christian Science is not a slavery. It has opened the oor of hope and freedom to many. For them it has put to flight weakess, and weariness, and sick-disgust of life. Its metaphysic may not be ound; it may be fundamentally 'inconsistent with all the main positions f Christian theology'—this we are inclined to doubt—but this is not going o check its advance if it is able to produce healthy and happy lives. When he Christian Church, or some other influence, can do better in that direcon than Christian Science is doing, the growth of the latter will cease, ut not until then. H.D.A.M.

SOME MODERN PROPHETS.

That 'Lives of great men all remind us . . .' may seem rather hackeyed to-day, but there can be little question about the value and stimulus f a well-written biography. *Six Great Anglicans* (S.C.M., pp. 250, price /-), written by the Archbishop of Melbourne while he was yet Canon F. V. Head, is perhaps less biography than short studies in the lives of six rominent Churchmen of last century. But it has all the stimulus of bio-

graphy in that it presents not only the aims and ideals of these parish priests, but also the bearing of each life upon the practical needs of to-day. And for this purpose the names are well chosen. Keble, who taught a world which was searching for brotherhood to find in the Church a bond of Fellowship; Walter F. Hook, with his genius for efficient pastoral work; F. W. Robertson, who so ably transplanted Liberal teaching from the study to the pulpit; Kingsley, with his passion for social righteousness; and Canon Barnett, whose hopeful disposition remained undimmed during the darkest times of a dark parish, and so helped to re-light the candle of faith: all these were giants in their days and ways.

We have left out one name. Some of us have usually thought of Charles Simeon chiefly as an exponent of prejudice and false theology. But Canon Head has a more sympathetic approach, and, while he in no way disguises his failings, he yet gives us a good picture of him labouring against fierce opposition, thinking out and using new ways of getting to the hearts of his people, and finally gaining an assured position of leadership. Canon Head suggests that Evangelicanism of a century ago was summed up in Charles Wesley's hymn, 'Jesu lover of my soul.' If so, we may thank God that Evangelicanism has rapidly changed since then! But even a century ago, its undoubted power lay not in any suggestion of fleeing from life's problems but in its offer of a gospel which gave back to men a sense of the eternal value. This it was that gave power to the good news preached by Charles Simeon; it was the good news which assured a man in his search for God that 'the Son of God had already searched for him and *found* him.' God was not necessarily nearer to him in Church than elsewhere; He was always about his path. We still need that Evangelical faith which finds Him everywhere. This book will well repay reading, and might quite profitably form the basis of a course of sermons.

J.P.H.

THE CLERICAL *SINE QUA NON*.*

We welcome the publication of the fifty-ninth issue of *Crockford's Clerical Directory*—the indispensable handbook of the Church of England (*Ecclesia gentis Anglorum per orbem terrarum diffusa*, if we may so Latinize it). This issue of *Crockford* consists of more than 2,000 double-columned pages of closely, but clearly, printed matter. Its frontispiece map of the dioceses of England provides food for reflection. It is possible that with the industrialization of Southern England the tiny dioceses of Winchester, Portsmouth and Guildford will not prove too small for their bishops. The populations of the two latter bishoprics are not given in *Crockford*. Is it because they are Lilliputian?

Although *Crockford* states that when a clergyman of the English Church enters the American Church his name disappears automatically, we are glad to see that *Crockford* has retained the names of Professors Kirsopp Lake, Foakes-Jackson, and Leonard Hodgson. The Editor in his interesting preface fears that unless the Bishops take steps to secure the familiarization of churchgoers with the Deposited Book, the book will soon become a dead letter. Does it matter if it does? We are becoming more and more impressed with its literary and liturgical inadequacy. There is, we believe, a growing feeling that its rejection delivered the Church from a very mediocre composition. We may certainly hope that when we do get our Revised Prayer Book it will be a more meritorious production.

Crockford feels no compassion for a lay-impropriator who was sent to prison for refusing to repair the chancel of the parish church. In this matter we share *Crockford's* hardness of heart.

* Published by the Oxford University Press; price £3/3/- (1930).

The new regulation that only one-third of the Parish Church Council need retire annually, and that these be eligible for re-election, are favoured by the Editor. His conclusion about the doings of the Church Assembly will meet with general approval:

> 'It is becoming increasingly clear that the Assembly must be content to go slower in the future than it has done in the past.'

The proposal for 'voluntary clergy' is criticized, but the new sacristry for Westminster Abbey is approved. The South Indian Church Union Scheme is treated with great sympathy. There is much ripe wisdom in the Editor's preface. The Church at large owes a debt to the Editor and publishers of *Crockford*, and we venture to hope that the sales of the fifty-ninth edition will do something to discharge it. H.D.A.M.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROFESSOR EDDINGTON TO A METAPHYSIC OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD.*

With the increasing development of specialised departments of knowledge, it becomes increasingly difficult to appreciate the importance of the various departments for a consistent philosophy of the world as a whole. The philosopher, lacking a specialised training in science, can no longer provide a *scientia scientarum*. The student of physics on his part lacks the wider knowledge with which to frame a metaphysic of the physical world. The theologian needs both a close knowledge of the nature of the created world, and a broad philosophy of the nature of the relation of God to the created world; and he knows not where to turn for either, amid the myriad disconnected books produced in and about the modern world. In this situation it is of tremendous value to find a writer who, like Professor Eddington, can give a survey of the latest results of physics in a form which will show the metaphysical implications of the world with which physics deals. In view of the importance of a knowledge of the metaphysic of the physical world, for the theologian who must form a theory of the nature of divine action in the world, it has been thought well to depart somewhat from the accustomed method of the reviewer, and to offer a reasoned analysis, with quotations from Professor Eddington's works, of the contrast of the old and the new physics, and of the philosophical and theological implications of this contrast.

A. The Old Physics.

Two difficulties for a theistic interpretation of the world.

(1) *Ultimate materialism.*—The ultimate reality of concrete matter. In consequence mind and spirit either had to be regarded as epi-phenomena of matter, and the real existence of a spiritual world was thus denied; or else there was an ultimate dualism of mind and matter, and the material world was left, existent in its own right, working by its own laws, and removed from the influence of God.

(2) *Ultimate mechanism.*—The rigid reign throughout the world of unbroken law. From the determinism of the material world, there followed a determinism of the epi-phenomenal or concomitant mental world. What then of the work of God in the world?

By one solution God worked by breaking the laws of nature. In the supposed interest of religion an irruptive view of miracles was preserved.

* *The Nature of the Physical World.* By A. S. Eddington, M.A., Ll.D., D.Sc., F.R.S. Gifford Lectures, 1927. (Cambridge University Press, 1929. Pages xix+361. 12/6.)
Science and the Unseen World. By A. S. Eddington. Swarthmore Lecture, 1929. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pages 56. 1/6.)
(In the above review figures alone give references to the first and larger work; references to the Swarthmore Lecture are preceded by the letters Sw.)

This was unsatisfactory for the scientist. If one miracle had happened, the presupposition of science, a presupposition strengthened by all the achievements of science in the nineteenth century, was broken. It was not really satisfactory for religion. It gave a picture of a fickle God, making laws and arbitrarily breaking them. It gave also a God, unknown in the created world, and seen only through the chinks in the universe.

Alternatively, science was right and there were no irruptive miracles. But religion could not easily concede universal determinism. If any form of belief in God is compatible with universal determinism, it is only that God is in some sense in the laws of the mechanism; God is everywhere in the same way, and a God who is equally everywhere is virtually nowhere. If God worked only through a scheme of deterministic law, there could be no recognition of his work nor prayer for his work as influencing particular events. Moreover the freedom of man to influence the physical world is involved with the freedom of God; if the physical world is rigidly determined, so also is the mental, and there can then be no moral or rational 'ought.' The philosophy of the old physics, 'Whatever is could not be otherwise,' left logically no room for moral judgment, for rational argument, for religious faith or prayer.

B. The Break Down of the Mechanism of the Old Physics.

(1) *General Statement of the Fact and Magnitude of the Change.*—In the light of the new physics we escape from this dilemma of irruptive miracles or a pantheistic determinism, not by seizing either horn, but by denying the presupposition that the world with which science deals is governed by determinist laws.

Sw. 21: 'What I wish to point out is that we no longer have the disposition which as soon as it scents a piece of mechanism exclaims, "Here we are getting to bedrock. This is what things should resolve themselves into." Physics to-day is not likely to be attracted by a type of explanation of the mind, which it would scornfully reject for its own aether.'

350: 'If our expectation should prove well founded that 1927 has seen the final overthrow of strict causality by Heisenberg, Bohr, Born and others, the year will certainly rank as one of the greatest epochs in the development of scientific philosophy.'

(2) *Denial of Strict Causality.*—297. Causality is distinguished from causation. As a description of causality: 'Ideally the whole world past and future is connected into a deterministic scheme by relations of causality. Up till very recently it was universally held that such a determinate scheme must exist.' But now, 332: 'Strict causality is abandoned in the material world. Our ideas of the controlling laws are in process of reconstruction, and it is not possible to predict what kind of form they will ultimately take; but all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently. This relieves the former necessity of supposing that mind is subject to deterministic law, or, alternatively that it can suspend deterministic law in the material world.

(3) *Denial of Primary Laws.*—75. Primary and secondary laws are distinguished, the former dealing with individuals, the latter with averages, the former dealing with impossibilities, the latter with improbabilities. Then, 98: 'The cast iron determinism of primary law is, I think, still widely accepted, but no longer unquestioningly . . . It now seems clear that we have not yet got hold of *any* primary law—that all those laws at one time supposed to be primary are in reality statistical . . . It is difficult to see now any justification for the strongly rooted conviction in the ultimate re-establishment of a deterministic scheme of law, except a supposed necessity

of thought. Thought has grown accustomed to doing without a great many necessities in recent years. One would not be surprised if in the reconstruction of the scheme of physics which the quantum theory is now pressing on us, secondary law becomes the basis and primary law is discarded.'

(4) *The Explicit Denial of Scientific Determinism.*—A denial apparently becoming clearer and stronger from Prof. Eddington, as his study of the quantum theory proceeds. 294 : ' It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law. Determinism has dropped out altogether in the latest formulations of theoretical physics, and it is at least open to doubt whether it will ever be brought back. . . . In re-writing this chapter a year later I have had to mingle with this attitude of indifference an attitude more definitely hostile to determinism, which has arisen from the acceptance of the Principle of Indeterminacy.'

(5) *The Necessary Change in the Theoretical Background of Science.*—It is suggested as an objection to this change from the old determinism that ' the current epistemology of science presupposes a deterministic scheme of this type. To modify it involves a much deeper change in our attitude to natural knowledge than the mere abandonment of an untenable hypothesis.' Prof. Eddington accepts this change as necessary for science. 299 : ' Whether or not there is a causal scheme at the base of atomic phenomena, modern atomic theory is not now attempting to find it ; and it is making rapid progress because it no longer sets this up as a practical aim. We are in the position of holding an epistemological theory of natural knowledge which does not correspond to actual aim of current scientific investigation.' We may comment that this change of background raises important issues for philosophy and theology. Were philosophical proofs of the background of strict causality motivated by the requirements of contemporary science? What happens to a philosophy of universal determinist causality when science on its side has abandoned that background? What happens to the arguments for mental determinism when we abandon concomitant physical determinism? Further, it is futile for the theologian to argue either for or against the miraculous, on the basis of the old scientific view of the universe as a closed system, when to contemporary science the universe is not closed but free.

(6) *The Impossibility of Prediction.*—In terms of the old science we still debate whether the success of prediction in the physical world may not be extended up the scale of being, so that with sufficient knowledge we could predict human action, as we predict an eclipse. Meanwhile, however, the new physics is giving up prediction, just where we had begun by taking it for granted.

300 : ' When we ask what is the characteristic of the phenomena that have been successfully predicted, the answer is that they are effects depending on the average configurations of vast numbers of individual entities.' 302 : ' The position is that the laws governing the microscopic elements of the physical world, individual atoms, electrons, quanta, do not make definite predictions as to what the individual will do next.'

This impossibility of prediction is not, as with our deep-rooted old scientific background we should think, due to inadequate knowledge. The nature of the material is such that definite knowledge would never be possible. There is always a chance element in the atom, and the laws only give the odds. 294 : ' The future is a combination of the causal influences of the past together with unpredictable elements—unpredictable not merely because it is impracticable to obtain the data of prediction, but because no data connected causally with our experience exists.'

(7) *The New Scope for Freedom.*—The moral law requires freedom. Law in the old physics, and in popular scientific use to-day, implies that which must happen—*i.e.* which cannot but happen. Law in the ethical and the political use implies that which ought to happen, and by implication may not happen.. The possibility of the moral law implies therefore that the future course of the physical world, in which world if in any man is active, is not predetermined, but as yet undetermined. This question is allied directly and indirectly to theism. The reality of divine government of the world is directly involved with the validity of the moral judgment. Indirectly, if the human spirit or mind can affect the course of physical events, then, certainly as working through human spirit, possibly by direct action on the world, God also may alter the course of physical events, and there is then place for prayer that God will act in the world in a certain way. If the determinist theory of the physical world is held to rule human behaviour, then probably it will also be held to rule divine behaviour, and we are back in the dilemma of pantheism or a fickle, irrupting deity. Hence the importance for theism, if from the physical side the determinism of the world is abandoned, if scientific law be held with moral law to allow indeterminacy.

In the earlier essay of Prof. Eddington in *Science, Religion and Reality*, there was a very cautious admission of the possibility of freedom. 216 of this book he said, 'Interference of human free-will with the identical laws cannot be admitted; even omnipotence could scarcely set these aside, and free-will does not mean omnipotence . . . I fear that there can be no satisfactory theory of free-will without admitting an interference with statistical laws. The serious difficulty arises that at present no failure of the statistical laws has been detected in experiments made on living organisms, and that the belief of these laws, the second law of thermodynamics, has been verified with some accuracy.' All the more striking are the statements in the later book.

295 : 'We may note that science thereby withdraws its moral opposition to free-will.'

310 : 'If we wish to emancipate mind we must to some extent emancipate the material world also (*i.e.* from deterministic control). There appears to be no longer any obstacle to this emancipation.'

313 : 'It seems that we must attribute to the mind power not only to decide the behaviour of atoms individually, but to affect systematically large groups—in fact to tamper with the odds on atomic behaviour.'

It may be suggested that the physical laws of mass and motion were the first source of the philosophy of strict determinism. From this field, science proceeded to adopt the presupposition of determinism for the interpretation of the biological world, and philosophy then adopted the scientific presupposition for the interpretation of the whole field of reality, including mental phenomena. Hence came the quarrel between religion and science, and the problems of the miraculous and of petitionary prayer. Now physics has abandoned determinism; the apparent determinism in the movement of large masses is due to statistical laws of averages. In the ultimate constituents of matter there is a chance element, strictly undetermined. Writers on the philosophy of evolution since Bergson are also saying that in their field biological development is undetermined and unpredictable. Can a theory be suggested by philosophy and tested by science that in each of the ascending levels of reality, matter, life, mind and spirit there is a chance element, which is controlled when that level is subsumed in the higher level? Is the chance element in the physical world in some way brought under control when the physical constituents are organised in a living organism? In place of the mechanical determined world and the fickle God, have we

ien the much stronger theological position, resulting from a closer scientic study of the world, that the world is free and undetermined in its action, ut that in its higher levels it is progressively being brought under the ontrol of a God who is determined to one purpose by his own holy will?

(8) *The New Scope for the Supernatural.*—It is clearly recognised that thus allowing an element of chance or freedom in the physical world, and ie control of this chance element by mind, there is scope for the supernatural.

309: 'A rather serious consequence of dropping causality in the external orld is that it leaves us with no clear distinction between the Natural and ie Supernatural . . . Either the physicist must leave his causal scheme at ie mercy of supernatural interference from me, or he must explain away ıy supernatural qualities. In self-defence the materialist favoured the latter ourse; he decided that I was not supernatural, only complicated. We, on ie other hand, have concluded that there is not strict causal behaviour nywhere.'

347: 'Another charge launched against these lectures may be that of dmitting some degree of supernaturalism, which in the eyes of many is ie same thing as superstition. In so far as supernaturalism is associated ith the denial of strict causality I can only answer that that is what the ıodern scientific development of the quantum theory brings us to.'

This is not of course bringing back the supernatural in the old sense of ie irruptive miracle, because the background has gone which would make necessary to regard the miracle as irruptive. It is, however, also not eing impaled on the other horn of the dilemma, the exclusion of the direct, ree action of spirit on the material world. We seem to be getting back to biblical attitude toward the miraculous, where there are events which are upernormal, and where these events are ascribed to the power of God, but vhere they are not regarded as breaking natural laws, for the simple reason hat there is no theory of natural laws there waiting to be broken. If the niverse has a free element from the bottom upwards, it is quite open to us o admit, what is indeed evident on the New Testament record, that beyond ormal human action there is a power of faith, which through undoubting onfidence in God brings the world into closer harmony with the purpose of God. Such action will then be miraculous relative to normal human action, n the same way that life is miraculous, relative to the behaviour of nonıving matter. It will not break any laws of lower levels of existence, but t will discover new power by organising the free element in lower levels. f we follow Professor Eddington in abandoning scientific determinism, eligion need no longer sit at the feet of science, and ask for instructions s to what is going to happen in the world; the universe is free once more or the adventure of religious faith, and it will rest with science to follow nd describe the achievements of faith.

C. The Breakdown of the Materialism of the Old Physics.

Ultimate materialism, like mechanism, in the old physics, was an bstacle to an effective theism. Science was dealing with concrete things, natter, force, mass; and the success of science made it probable that in ealing with these things it had touched the rock bottom of that which was ltimately real.

The materialism of the naive realist, fostered by a little knowledge of ld physics, dies hard. As, however, the analysis of science has become nore and more refined, it has become more and more evident that the world s not made up of such simple material constituents as the materialist supposed. The scientific picture of the world is a highly elaborate intellectual

structure. Atoms are not just very small billiard balls; the reality of the physical world as science pictures it can not be expressed otherwise than in an elaborate system of mathematical equations. Sw. 29: 'If to-day you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the aether or the electron to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that; it has no means of probing beneath the symbolism.'

It is obviously open to the philosophical idealist to apply the idealist argument, that the external world is dependent on mind, not mind on the external world. The Berkeleyan argument for the dependence of the world of colours and sounds and shapes on the perceiving mind is obviously far stronger in form for the dependence of this new world of elaborate intellectual formulae on mind.

This idealisation of physics, and the consequent removal of the other obstacle to theism in the old physics, also finds its place in Professor Eddington's view of the world.

276: 'To put the conclusion crudely—the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by 'mind' I do not here exactly mean mind, and that by 'stuff' I do not at all mean stuff. Still, this is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase. The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness. The realistic matter and fields of force of former physical theory are altogether irrelevant—except in so far as the mind-stuff has itself spun these imaginings.'

So also Sw. 25: 'In comparing the certainty of things spiritual and things temporal let us not forget this—Mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience; all else is remote inference. That environment of space and time and matter, of light and colour and concrete things, which seems so vividly real to us, is probed deeply by every device of physical science, and at the bottom we reach symbols. Its substance has melted into shadow. None the less, it remains a real world if there is a background to the symbols, an unknown quantity which the mathematical symbol × stands for. We think we are not wholly cut off from this background. It is to this background that our own personality and consciousness belong, and those spiritual aspects of our nature not to be described by any symbolism, or at least not to be described by any symbolism of the numerical kind, to which mathematical physics has hitherto restricted itself. Our story of evolution ended with a stirring in the brain organ of the latest of Nature's experiments; but that stirring of consciousness transmutes the whole story and gives meaning to its symbolism. Symbolically it is the end, but looking behind the symbolism it is at the beginning.'

D. The Physical World and Ultimate Theism.

This transmutation paves the way for theism. According to the uncritical scientific view of the world, millions of stars chance after millions of years to produce a planetary system; after further millions of years the temperature in one star, and perhaps one or two more, reaches such a degree that nature can make experiments with living organisms; after the rejection of many experiments there is born into our world a man; after long ages man has a conception of God. Is the physical world the ultimate reality, and is God the peculiar emergent ideal of the temporary emerging being of

one planet? Is the transmutation possible, and is the God whom at last on this one planet men come to know the author of the whole system of nature which has led up to man? Only if God is author and not just emergent product of the world is there any true theism.

In Professor Eddington's metaphysic of the physical world, at least the two main obstacles to theism in the old physics are, as we have seen, removed. The material world is dependent on the more real world of spirit. The material world is not rigidly determined by its own strict laws, but is in a measure free, and open to influence by the world of spirit. Thus from the side of science, from a more close study of the physical world, Professor Eddington rejects the materialism and the mechanism of the old physics, and himself concludes with a theist position.

281 : 'Physical science has seemed to occupy a domain of reality which is self-sufficient, pursuing its course independently of and indifferent to that which a voice within us asserts to be a higher reality. We are jealous of such independence. We are uneasy that there should be an apparently self-contained world in which God becomes an unnecessary hypothesis . . . The sphere of the differential equations of physics is the metrical cyclic scheme extracted out of the broader reality. However much the ramifications of the cycles may be extended by further scientific discovery, they cannot from their very nature trench on the background in which they have their being—their actuality. It is in this background that our own mental consciousness lies; and here, if anywhere, we may find a Power greater than but akin to consciousness. . . . The crudest anthropmorphic image of a spiritual deity can scarcely be so wide of the truth as one conceived in terms of metrical equations.'

Sw. 49 : 'It seems right at this point to say a few words in relation to the question of a Personal God. It is, I think, of the very essence of the unseen world that the conception of personality should dominate it . . . I think, therefore, we are not wrong in embodying the significance of the spiritual world to ourselves in the feeling of a personal relationship.'

GEOFFREY ALLEN.

CORRESPONDENCE

WOMEN AND THE PRIESTHOOD.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

Not a few of your readers, men and women, will read with surprise and some indignation the remarks regarding the admission of women to the priesthood in the February number of the *Modern Churchman.*

Surprise will be occasioned that the modernist attitude towards this subject should be expressed by begging the question. Indignation is aroused at the injustice towards women in the extremely illogical reasoning against their admission to the priesthood.

Expediency is an ugly word in the ears of a Modernist who professes to seek the truth and, having found it, to be under the honourable obligation to put it into practice.

The writer, in his criticism of Dr. Mahoney's book, concedes the truth of the principle in the following words : 'If women were able to be prophets, and received the Holy Spirit for that purpose, how much more might they not be able to be priests, for in that Apostolic Church prophets ranked next to Apostles.' Having established the principle, he then proceeds to raise certain nervous and purely imaginary objections to putting it into

practice. He cites the present 'moral and spiritual condition of the Church of England' as being a reason for not ordaining women, and, comparing women with slaves, voices what is in fact the culpable attitude of the Church towards women in maintaining them in bondage and subordination. One would have expected a Modernist to advocate fearlessly the emancipation of women in spiritual as in material matters rather than to acquiesce with the Church in this attitude.

The extraordinary theory that women should first prove their worth in other professions before seeking ordination to the priesthood is put forward. Does the same reasoning apply to a man? Should he, knowing that he has a vocation to the priesthood, first prove his worth as an electrical engineer or in any other profession?

Again, 'no married woman, especially one with a family, should be a priest.' Why ordination under such circumstances should be denied to women it is hard to see, considering the needless Church work the wife of a priest is expected to do in addition to rearing a family. The real fact of the case is that, in all probability, if ordination were open to women a married woman with children would not seek it, finding her work quite sufficient unto the day. At the same time, a woman as a free human being, should not be penalised by marriage from making her own choice of a profession. The supposed influx of the mothers of children into the priesthood is no sound reason for denying the vocation to the unmarried women. Dr. Mahoney's frank statement that 'every priest, like St. Paul, has used their indispensable help' is typical of the Church's attitude towards women, though it is perhaps an injustice to St. Paul.

Dr. Mahoney's contention 'that Christ did not will to ordain women priests,' or call the Blessed Virgin Mary to that office, may be met by the statement that neither did He ordain a Gentile priesthood and that Mary, having received the highest honour bestowed upon women, the implication of the lesser office might be concluded as contained in the greater. One would not say because a man was an Archbishop that therefore he was incapable of being a priest. The advocates of ordination for women do not claim that all women have the vocation to the priesthood or that there are not other equally important offices that women can fill in their service to humanity.

For the Church to act only upon what Christ explicitly commanded or left undeveloped would be to deny the present working of the Holy Spirit and to hinder the Church in the progress which is so necessary if it is to be a living and vital influence in the perfecting of human nature.

67 Avenue Wendt, Geneva, Switzerland. EDITH RODGERS.
March 3rd, 1930.

[We have never advocated as a Modernist principle that in Church policy practical considerations should be ignored. We have advocated the fearless statement of truth and the intelligent endeavour to bring practice into conformity with principle. In the article, which our correspondent criticizes, there is nothing which conflicts with this advocacy. When our correspondent asks: 'Does the same reasoning apply to a man?' she misses the point. We said 'women,' not 'a woman,' meaning of course, women as a class, not any particular woman. Having accepted the principle of the admission of women to the priesthood, we advocated what seemed to us to be the best method of achieving it practically. Our correspondent does not seem to recognize these practical difficulties, yet the *crux* is there. We regret to have given pain.—ED., *M.C.*]

THE ABOLISHING OF WAR.

SIR,

Dr. McComb in your February issue fails to treat the financial causes of war. This is a serious weakness in presenting his case. Moreover, it is not quite correct to say that in paying the cost of wars 'a vast mass of gold is squandered by the nations every year.' When insisting that credit or some equivalent term be substituted for gold, one is not merely splitting hairs over terminology. The distinction is extremely important.

Again, strange as it may seem, it is only partly true that money saved on armament reduction is available for other and nobler uses. And when Dr. McComb speaks of war as an anachronism he is wrong again, for whatever may have caused wars in the past it is more than likely that future causes will be economic. Readers will recall the title of a book published not long ago, *We fight for Oil*. Assuming that for the moment, one sees that Dr. McComb's statement, 'National selfishness is as fatal to a people as personal selfishness is to an individual,' needs qualifying.

The basis of the foregoing assumption is that no highly industrialised nation is able to absorb within its own boundaries all the things its manufacturers produce. The economic explanation of this is too technical to work out in a magazine like the *Modern Churchman*. Put crudely, it is that total final purchasing power in the hands of consumers is always considerably less than aggregate final prices.

If a people be financially incapable of buying back for its own use what its manufacturing plant ultimately throws on the market, the only hypothetical outlet remaining to it is the foreign market. Now all industrialised nations are in the same boat—they must have an external dumping ground. This is not synonymous with a mutual exchange market, for if a community is physically or financially incompetent to buy back its own products it is *ipso facto* incapable of buying back goods in exchange for its surplus production. It follows that unless nations are disposed to arbitrate as to who shall starve, they are driven to face up to the last term of competition, which is war. Now this may be, and is, morally regrettable; it can scarcely be termed an anachronism.

(REV.) HERBERT EDWARDS,
President, Settle Branch,
League of Nations Union.

Stainforth Vicarage, Settle.
February 24th, 1930.

THE WAY OF RENEWAL.

SIR,

Like your correspondent from Nice in your last number, I have long felt the inadequacy and want of reality in our average Church services: I am not surprised that thinking Christians and practically-minded business men and working men have no use for them.

The average morning service—and this service still collects the largest number of adherents—appears to consist of nothing more than 1¼ hours of reverent inattention: no freshness or vitality in the prayers, no brightness or intelligence in the delivery of the lessons, no concern for the meaning of the words in the Hymns or Psalms or Creeds, and, last but not least, no perceptible effort to lead the congregation into a spiritual world and raise them to a sense of the being and presence of God. Cannot something be done?

I do not think it is absolutely essential, though desirable, to have a Revised Prayer Book, for I have attended two churches where the right spirit is observable even with the old formulae, and I detect it also in the

Studio Services on the 'Wireless.' My suggestion is that our clergy should strive to find and assimilate this spirit, and learn to give something more intellectual, substantial and spiritual to their congregations, instead of inflicting the positive agony to which your correspondent refers.

Mildenhall, Suffolk. C. C. LEMPRIERE.

MODERNISTS AND REUNION.

SIR,

May I set down briefly a few reflections suggested by your Notes on *Modernists and Reunion* in the December *Modern Churchman,* which for one welcomed very sincerely? I write as a layman and slight scholar in such matters, but forty years of Modernist thought and reading may perhaps justify the expression of opinions, without, however, guaranteeing that the opinions are correct.

It is, I think, most true that with regard to all questions of Church policy, Modern Churchmen should think out their own proposals. And as regards this vexed and (as you have suggested) largely mis-handled question of Reunion, our guiding principle should, I would submit, be that while many and various things are helpful to Christian friendship and co-operation (some things being more helpful to one set of people and others to another), *one thing is essential*—the condition of being joined together and meeting and working together as those who believe in Christ and are desirous of serving that Kingdom of God, the victory of right in the world.

The Modernist is also to simplify his belief about the Church in this way because the study of history does not seem to him to justify the insistence on particular forms of Church order or particular rites (however valuable he may think them to be), as being of indubitably direct divine authority, while he does find a clear teaching that 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' As Dean Inge has said, 'The true apostolical succession is in the lives of the saints.'

And one may add in passing that in regard to the Church, as in regard to the Bible, the Modernist view does not necessarily imply any less genuine appreciation and belief than the old one, but on the contrary. If we believe that our Lord is present with us and takes part in all that is rightly done in the Church, though in ways which are beyond our understanding—and no less a belief seems to me to correspond adequately with his claim on the faith and loyalty of his hearers in the most undoubtedly historical parts of the Gospels, with our sense of need and with Christian experience—we cannot think lightly of the Church or of anything it rightly does, though the question does then become essential, '*Are* they rightly done?' In other words, we are thrown back on our own judgment; and the test becomes one of intrinsic value and proved usefulness, and not one of special institution or mere antiquity.

If the guiding principle as to the essential of the Church, which I have tried to state above, is accepted, then it seems to follow that 'Reunion' should begin, not by one or more Christian communities insisting that all others shall accept their own orders and observances, but *by a mutual recognition of each other as true sections or branches of the one fellowship of Christian people.* And from this recognition the two main lines of advance which you have advocated (namely, interdenominational friendship and federation) seem naturally to follow. May I enlarge briefly as to these?

In the first place, we shall wish to cultivate the acquaintance—and the sincere respect and friendship which, in my experience, resulted from such acquaintance— of Christian people in other denominations, and to join

vith them from time to time in worship. Inter-communion is, of course, n a sense the highest form of this 'interdenominational' fellowship: but t would also include, on the one hand, invitations to members of other lenominations to speak for us, and, on the other, occasional attendance on he part of individual churchmen at the services and other meetings of hese Churches. The *second* of these things seems to me, if anything, even nore important than the first.

Openness of Communion is, I think, as you have said, the first thing vhich Modernists should work for. But I feel this should mean more for is than even the welcoming to our celebrations of Communicants from ther Christian bodies, great as that step would be. Can we not say, as he Free Churches very frequently do, that we welcome all sincere Chris-ians who may be present. It seems to me a true instinct which leads our Nonconformist friends to do this. It is true such a declaration would not mply any distinct recognition of the status of other Churches. But, *in the irst place,* I doubt if the more limited one would be felt by them as a very lear recognition, since they do not generally, I think, limit their own ommunions to any definite class of people, either among their own ad-erents or among those outside their own Church; and *in the second place,* he clearest recognition we can give—and the one I feel we should give—f other Churches is by reciprocrity. We should gladly accept ,as occasion ffers, the invitations of other Churches to take part in their communions. Gwatkin makes it clear, as it seems to me (in his 'Kikuyu Tract,' *The Confirmation Rubric, Whom does it bind?*), that the Prayer Book, rightly nderstood, does not forbid inter-communion with non-episcopal Churches, nd that it is, in fact, quite in accordance with the practice of our Church luring the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

As regards federation, would it not be well if, given inter-communion, ve had in this country a federal council, not of the Free Churches only, ut of all the Christian Churches who would be willing to join it, and on a road basis, of belief and purpose, to include the Roman Catholics on the ne hand and the Quakers and the Salvationists on the other? I share vith, I think, many people the feeling that any reunion which leaves out he two latter, unconventional but sincerely Christian bodies, would be ery seriously deficient. Once such a council was established, it would (as n the case of the League of Nations in international affairs) be found a aluable means of the co-operation you have suggested.

It may, perhaps, be worth while to add that these two proposals, of nter-church friendship and of federation, would not necessarily imply that ne differences of rite and custom, etc., which distinguish and at present ivide us are unimportant. But they do imply that these differences are ot, in our view, of the first importance. Neither would the proposals mply that the differences and decisions are irrevocably fixed. They have risen through historical causes, and are capable of being modified or bolished. They will have the best chance of being changed for the better n the atmosphere of friendship and co-operation which the two proposals ould tend to promote.

In conclusion, may I express strong agreement with your views that Modern Churchmen 'need to possess a clear-cut policy and then to secure upport for it'? It is no answer to such proposals to say that they (or ome of them) are at present impracticable. As Modern Churchmen, we ould, I feel, think out the soundest policy we can, and then do all that in s lies to secure its adoption by our Church as a whole.

A. FLOYD.

Purley, Surrey.
March 1st, 1930.

A TASK FOR MODERNISTS.

SIR,

I have always felt that the greatest work of the Modernist Movement is in the education of young people, so that when they grow up there will be no temptation to set their Christian belief alongside fairy tales, to be discarded as childish things. Being now faced with the practical problem of beginning children's education in Christianity, I am finding—and I am sure that there must be many like me—great difficulty in discovering suitable books, books that are free from explanations of belief which Modernists do not regard as helpful either to children or to adults.

I have spent some time in the S.P.C.K. bookshop looking through religious books for children. I came across one which on the first page said that Joseph 'was espoused to the Virgin Mary.' Others dealt elaborately with miracles, both in the Old and New Testaments. I found one helpful book, *A Baby's Life of Jesus,* by Mary F. Rolt (S.P.C.K.); this mercifully spared us the Virgin Birth, but deals far too much with the physical miracles. A whole chapter describes Our Lord walking on the sea; how can that help the infant mind to love Our Lord as a man first of all?

I believe whole-heartedly that the true approach to our faith is (1) to begin the teaching in the home, and (2) to begin with the life of Jesus and to present him as God's greatest son, the most wonderful man who has ever lived. Has our Modernist Movement any men or women who, with the psychology of a Froebel, can write Bible books for (*a*) infants of four, (*b*) children of say six to eight, and (*c*) children of nine to fifteen? It is essential that such books be well illustrated.

If any such books exist, I shall be most grateful to hear of them. If not, surely there can be no nobler work for those who have been preparing the excellent pamphlets which have for some time been available.

CLAUD MULLINS.

14 Burgh Heath Road, Epsom.

[The Principal of St. Christopher's College, Blackheath, recommends Sinclair Stevenson's *Friend of Little Children* (Blackwell, Oxford: price 7/6) and *Knights of the Great Prince* (published by the Religious Tract Society, price 10/6.)]

[We should be glad to receive particulars (title, author, publisher, price) of such books as our correspondent requires.—ED., *M.C.*]

WEEK-END CONFERENCE AT JORDANS.

SIR,

I shall be glad if you will kindly allow me to draw the attention of members of the Union to the fact that Jordans has been booked for a short week-end conference, May 17th to 19th. Details will be given later.

T. J. WOOD.

Organizing Secretary.

The Church House, Westminster, London, S.W.1.

6th March, 1930.

[*We are glad to publish correspondence, but would beg our correspondents to be concise.*—ED., *M.C.*]